Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO summarized an earlier report on the Air Force's: (1) strategic Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) II; and (2) its tactical variant, the SRAM T missile. GAO noted that: (1) it concluded that SRAM II range and accuracy capabilities had been degraded due to development problems; (2) despite the changes, the contractor was still unable to meet the range requirements, and proposed reductions to the SRAM II ranges; (3) the Strategic Air Command reduced its required ranges as part of an overall review of strategic requirements, and the contractor's bid would have met the revised requirements; (4) at program termination, the SRAM II schedule had slipped 4 years and its estimated cost had doubled; (5) SRAM T development was contingent on the resolution of SRAM II technical problems; (6) estimated SRAM T program costs had doubled since 1989 and the schedule had slipped about 3 years; and (7) the Air Force and the Department of Energy concluded that there were technical risks in using SRAM A due to its age, but the baseline warhead design for SRAM II could be incorporated into SRAM A.
