Summary: Investigation of nuclear powerplants security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) inspection and regulation of the security showed the systems to be inadequate. New regulations set up by NRC are an improvement, but further action needs to be taken, especially in regard to the hiring and training of guards. Commercial nuclear fuel facilities also need tighter security systems, although NRC has more stringent guidelines set up for the commercial plants than for the noncommercial ones. The primary concern at commercial plants is the control of dangerous special nuclear material, which are potential targets of terrorist groups. Since accounting for special nuclear materials is extremely complex, some discrepancy between physical and book inventories is expected. The discrepancies which cannot be reconciled are termed "material unaccounted for" (MUF). Since licensed facilities began operating in 1955, the MUF at major commercial facilities has amounted to thousands of kilograms of special nuclear materials. The physical security systems are increasingly critical because of the imprecisions of accounting for the special nuclear materials, but GAO found serious weaknesses in the systems. The weaknesses included improperly tested security alarms, unclear requirements of the placement of armed guards, poor personnel search and access control practices, and lack of emergency lighting in certain key security areas.
