Summary: Although there have been a number of threats against nuclear powerplants, there has never been a successful sabotage. GAO conducted a survey of security measures used by powerplant personnel. The results of the survey indicated that the degree of protection varied from plant to plant, and that some of the guard forces had major shortcomings. The differences were largely due to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) past failure to define minimum threat levels against which utilities could build their security systems. New regulations were put into use in March, 1977, 2-1/2 years after being published in the "Federal Register." Investigation of potential guard personnel varied from plant to plant, as did training of the guards. NRC investigators also varied in their inspections. Having established a minimum threat standard, NRC inspectors then checked to see if the powerplants could be protected against it. Before new security systems are approved by NRC, an on-site inspection should be conducted. The new requirements do not specify any upgrading of the quality of the guard force. NRC inspectors should be authorized and encouraged to appraise the systems in terms of whether they can cope with the minimum threat. Interim security regulation actions should be implemented until any new regulations are put into use.
