Summary: The Pentagon is developing a national missile defense program to shield the United States from a ballistic missile attack from "rogue" nations, such as North Korea and Iran. Following a departmental review by the end of July 2000, the administration plans to decide on whether to deploy the system. To reduce risks, the Defense Department (DOD) has, since GAO's 1998 report (GAO/NSIAD-98-153), delayed initial fielding of the national missile defense system from fiscal year 2003 to 2005; postponed decisions on the production of radars and interceptors, and boosted funding for testing. Even with the changes, however, significant performance and schedule risks persist. Developing a highly reliable hit-to-kill capability is a difficult technical challenge. Only three of the 19 planned intercept attempts are scheduled before the July 2000 deployment review. None of these attempts will expose the interceptor kill vehicle to the higher acceleration and vibration loans of the much faster, actual system booster. Because the program has a very aggressive schedule, it is vulnerable to delays. DOD has instituted several cost-control measures, including a process called "cost as an independent variable," which sets realistic cost objectives and trades off the system's performance and schedule to control costs. After incorporating cost savings from these measures, program officials estimated that the approved program would cost $36.2 billion over the life of the Capability I system--or about $7.5 billion more than the 1999 estimate. The cost rose mostly because of the decision to increase the number of interceptors and add flight tests, ground-test equipment, and a more capable radar facility. Costs are likely to increase further because of the vulnerability to schedule delays. Program officials estimate that each month of delay would increase program costs by $124 million.
