Summary: In its hundreds of reviews of weapons systems during the last 20 years, GAO has cited the same problems time and time again: cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortcomings. In GAO's view, the military's acquisition process has built-in incentives that encourage the premature commencement of weapons programs; the exaggeration of performance capabilities; and the understatement of expected costs, schedules, and risks. Leading firms in the private sector--from Chrysler to Caterpillar--have developed increasingly sophisticated products in less time and at lower costs. Behind their success is a knowledge-based approach that demands realism and candor at every stage of product development. At the end of product development, at which point key technologies are "matured," or proven to work, these firms know that they will be able to deliver a product that meets cost, quality, and schedule targets. The Defense Department, on the other hand, often rushes its weapons system prototypes into production only to discover later that they cost more than expected, take longer to produce, and deliver less than expected. A knowledge-based approach could help to reshape DOD's acquisition process. Programs managed using best practices are more likely to avoid cost and schedule overruns, which would alleviate the need for DOD to offset unexpected cost increases by disrupting funding for other modernization efforts.
