Summary: Risky shortcuts by McDonnell Douglas Corp. and lax oversight by the Air Force have spawned such severe computer software problems in the C-17 cargo jet that it is a case study in how not to manage software development in a major weapons system. At an estimated cost of $36 billion, the Air Force plans to buy 120 new C-17 aircraft, which are designed to airlift large payloads and oversized cargoes onto small airfields. The C-17 will be the most computerized, software-intensive, transport aircraft ever built. Program officials, having initially assumed that software was a low-risk endeavor, did not adequately assess or manage its software development. These officials later discovered that they often lacked specific knowledge about software problems when they first occurred, and did not ensure that McDonnell Douglas, the prime contractor, took timely corrective action. Actions by the Air Force and McDonnell Douglas in the wake of major software flareups in 1988 failed to keep software development and testing on schedule. As a result, the Air Force and McDonnell Douglas took several development shortcuts to meet flight test deadlines. In addition, other actions taken to reduce schedule delays may substantially boost software maintenance costs when the C-17 is eventually fielded. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Embedded Computer Systems: C-17 Software Development Problems, by Samuel W. Bowlin, Director of Defense and Security Information Systems Issues, before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations. GAO/T-IMTEC-92-17, May 13, 1992 (seven pages).
