Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined missile acquisition programs to determine: (1) whether they are meeting their cost and schedule goals; and (2) why some programs fail to meet those goals.
GAO found that: (1) all 12 of the missile systems reviewed experienced cost and schedule overruns; (2) the unit or total acquisition cost estimates for 9 of the 12 systems have increased by 20 percent or more, and the scheduled completion dates for all 12 systems were extended; (3) optimistic planning assumptions by program officials were a common factor underlying major overruns because program offices often develop cost and schedule estimates that do not adequately reflect the risks associated with the program's design, development, and production; (4) Department of Defense (DOD) independent technical risk assessments did not adequately reflect the risks associated with program design, development, and production; (5) DOD recently implemented revised regulations and procedures designed to improve technical risk management; (6) good internal controls are essential to achieving the proper conduct of government business with full accountability and serve as checks and balances against undesired actions; and (7) a 1989 study of weapon system cost and schedule trends found that tactical missiles experienced the highest total growth of any class of systems examined.
