Menu Search Account

LegiStorm

Get LegiStorm App Visit Product Demo Website
» Get LegiStorm App
» Get LegiStorm Pro Free Demo

Strategic Missiles: Uncertainties Persist in the Advanced Cruise Missile Program

  Premium   Download PDF Now (10 pages)
Report Type Reports and Testimonies
Report Date Nov. 16, 1990
Report No. NSIAD-91-35
Subject
Summary:

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program.

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force proposed to reduce ACM procurement from 1,461 to 1,000 missiles, due to budgetary constraints, but the Department of Defense (DOD) favored maintaining ACM procurement at 1,461 to provide additional operational flexibility; (2) several force structure issues remained unanswered, primarily time frames, the use of older missiles, and the impact of treaty agreements; (3) the Air Force could save about $734 million in procurement costs if it reduced its procurement plans by 261 missiles; (4) the Air Force's plans to competitively procure 901 missiles beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1992 may prove to be inappropriate if it reduces its planned procurement quantity; (5) flight testing indicated that ACM could meet most of its operational performance requirements, including range and accuracy; (6) even though the Air Force's ACM contractor was originally scheduled to begin deliveries in December 1986, it did not deliver its first operational ACM until June 1990; (7) the Air Force scheduled a contractor to complete qualification as a second ACM producer in April 1990 and deliver 14 qualification missiles by August 1990, but program restructuring could delay the contractor's qualification until October 1990 and delivery of the last qualification missile until December 1990; and (8) the Air Force's program cost estimate of $7 billion did not reflect potential changes in procurement quantity or acquisition strategy or include the cost of completing several important tasks.

« Return to search Government Accountability Office reports