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Countermeasures: Survivability of U.S. Radars Needs More Emphasis

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Report Type Reports and Testimonies
Report Date July 19, 1989
Report No. NSIAD-89-120
Subject
Summary:

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in developing effective countermeasures against the anti-radiation missile (ARM) threat; and (2) Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) oversight of ARM countermeasure development and coordination of military services' efforts.

GAO found that: (1) although DOD recognized the need for weapons systems to survive in combat, the services had made little progress in protecting mission-essential radars against the ARM threat; (2) only 3 of the 15 fielded weapons systems had ARM countermeasures under development; (3) DOD had not established a comprehensive ARM countermeasure program because it did not perceive existing information on the ARM threat to be significant; (4) the absence of definitive characteristics on the quantity and employment of threat systems contributed to the lack of significant countermeasure development; and (5) OSD did not have sufficient oversight to ensure the availability of sufficient threat data for use in developing an ARM countermeasure program.

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