Summary: In 2003, 31 residents died in nursing home fires in Hartford, Connecticut, and Nashville, Tennessee. Federal fire safety standards enforced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) did not require either home to have automatic sprinklers even though they have proven very effective in reducing the number of multiple deaths from fires. GAO was asked to report on (1) the rationale for not requiring all homes to be sprinklered, (2) the adequacy of federal fire safety standards for nursing homes that lack automatic sprinklers, and (3) the effectiveness of state and federal oversight of nursing home fire safety.
Cost has been a barrier to CMS requiring sprinklers for all older nursing homes even though sprinklers are considered to be the single most effective fire protection feature. There has never been a multiple-death fire in a fully sprinklered nursing home and sprinklers are now required in all new facilities. The decision to allow older, existing facilities to operate without sprinklers is now being reevaluated in light of the 2003 nursing home fires. Although the amount is uncertain, sprinkler retrofit costs remain a concern, and the nursing home industry endorses a transition period for homes to come into compliance with any new requirement. If retrofitting is eventually required, it is likely to be several years before implementation begins. The nursing home fires in Hartford and Nashville revealed weaknesses in federal nursing home fire safety standards for unsprinklered facilities. For example, federal standards did not require either home to have smoke detectors in resident rooms where the fires originated, and the fire department investigations suggested that their absence may have delayed the notification of staff and activation of the buildings' fire alarms. In light of inadequate staff response to the Hartford fire, the degree to which the standards rely on staff to protect and evacuate residents may be unrealistic. Moreover, many unsprinklered homes are not required to meet all federal fire safety standards if they obtain a waiver or are able to demonstrate that compensating features offer an equivalent level of fire safety. However, some of these exemptions raise a concern about whether resident safety was adequately considered. For example, a large number of unsprinklered homes in at least two states have waivers of standards designed to prevent the spread of smoke during a fire. State and federal oversight of nursing home fire safety is inadequate. Postfire investigations by Connecticut and Tennessee revealed deficiencies that existed, but were not cited, during prior surveys. For example, a survey conducted of the Hartford home 1 month prior to the fire did not uncover the lack of fire drills on the night shift and, on the night the fire occurred, the staff failed to implement the home's fire plan. The survey was conducted during the daytime and relied on inaccurate documentation that all shifts were conducting fire drills. On the other hand, Tennessee's postfire investigation failed to explore staff response, a deficiency cited on the home's four prior surveys. The limited number of federal fire safety assessments, though inconsistent with the statutory requirement for federal oversight surveys, nonetheless demonstrate that state surveyors either miss or fail to cite all fire safety deficiencies. CMS provides limited oversight of state survey activities to address these fire safety survey concerns. In general, CMS (1) lacks basic data to assess the appropriateness of uncorrected deficiencies, (2) infrequently reviews state trends in citing fire safety deficiencies, and (3) provides insufficient oversight of deficiencies that are waived or that homes do not correct because of asserted compensating fire safety features.
