Summary: The Army deployed its team, called Task Force Hawk, to participate in a Kosovo combat operation known as Operation Allied Force. This report (1) examines how Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared to Army and joint doctrine, (2) reviews the lessons learned identified from the operation and determines the status of actions to address those lessons, and (3) examines the extent to which the Army and the Air Force were able to operate together as a joint force. GAO concludes that Task Force Hawk's deep attacks against Serbian forces in Kosovo was consistent with doctrine, but was not typical in that the task force was supporting an air campaign rather than its more traditional role of being used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of enemy armor. The Army identified 107 items that require remedial action. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 items had been recommended for closure. Action is in process for the remaining 60 lessons. Finally, the Army and the Air Force experienced significant problems in their ability to work together jointly and the interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment used during the operation. The Army is working on both issues aggressively. However, it will take time for results to be seen.
