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Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations

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Report Type Reports and Testimonies
Report Date Feb. 15, 2001
Report No. GAO-01-198
Subject
Summary:

The National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, the Army calculates its force structure requirements on the basis of this scenario. The strategy also calls for the Army to support operations in a series of concurrent contingencies and assumes that forces thus engaged will be withdrawn and redeployed if war occurs. The Army's difficulty in supporting contingency operations without repeatedly calling on some types of units has raised questions about whether forces structured to meet the two-war scenario can also support multiple peacetime contingency operations. GAO reviewed the Army's force planning process, known as Total Army Analysis 2007, to determine whether the Army's planned force structure will meet its contingency requirements. GAO found that the Army's force structure generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting for more than six months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for long periods of time, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs.

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