Summary: In 1998, the State Department stockpiled anthrax vaccine and antibiotics at several diplomatic posts near Iraq. In the event of an anthrax attack by Iraq, this stockpile was to be used for post-exposure immunization and treatment. In 1999, the State announced that it was starting a voluntary Anthrax Immunization Program for U.S. government employees, their dependents, and other personnel overseas. According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), full pre-exposure protection from anthrax requires six vaccinations given over an 18-month period, followed by an annual booster. Because the supplies of vaccines approved by FDA were insufficient, State decided to suspend plans to expand the program beyond the pilot site until more vaccine was available. GAO found that both the State Department's prepositioning of anthrax vaccine at diplomatic missions and the voluntary anthrax immunization program have been poorly implemented. Specifically, the vaccine was not properly stored or refrigerated, requirements for the voluntary program were not accurately estimated, and surveillance procedures used in the pilot program to monitor reactions to the vaccine were inadequate.
