Summary: Since 1992, the Departments of Commerce and State have largely shared licensing responsibility for the export of commercial communications satellites. Congress has been concerned about reports that U.S. satellite companies provided China with sensitive technology useful for improving China's ballistic missiles. The Departments of Commerce and State included conditions meant to protect sensitive technology on 43 licensed commercial communications satellite campaigns by China, Russia, and Ukraine between 1989 and 1999. Licenses for 35 launch campaigns included five conditions, while licenses for eight launch campaigns issued by Commerce between 1994 and 1997 omitted three of these five conditions. Documents at the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State show that monitoring problems, unauthorized transfers of technology, and other violations of export controls regulations may have occurred in 14 launch campaigns in China, Russia, and Ukraine, including some of the campaigns where license safeguard conditions were omitted. These documents also show that sensitive technology was transferred in at least three cases and that two of these transfers raised national security concerns. Recent legislation that returned licensing authority for all commercial communications satellite exports from Commerce to State and led DOD to establish a monitoring organization should reduce confusion in the controls over these exports caused by the shared jurisdiction. However, some confusion may persist because license applications received before the transfer of jurisdiction in March 1999 will still be processed by Commerce, and approved licenses will be valid for up to two years. Consequently, there will still be a need for the agencies to coordinate their policies and monitoring of foreign launches. Despite this need, State, DOD, and Commerce have yet to agree on or establish clear procedures for each agency to follow in implementing the safeguards outlined in government-to-government agreements to safeguard technology.
