Summary: Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plans to use stepped-up inspections and improved data collection to better detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs, such as those in Iraq, it lacks a long-term plan to implement these efforts and may be forced to seek added U.S. financial support to pay for them. When and if member states adopt the Additional Protocol, IAEA will be able to use more intrusive measures, such as collecting information on all aspects of a state's nuclear industry, including research and development and nuclear import and export data; conducting short-notice inspections of undeclared or suspect sites and unannounced inspections at declared nuclear facilities; and taking environmental samples beyond locations where inspections now have access. However, IAEA lacks a long-term plan that (1) identifies the total resources needed to implement the new measures, (2) provides an implementation schedule with milestones for equipment and estimated projections for adoption of the Additional Protocol, and (3) provides criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the new measures and their usefulness for reducing inspection efforts. Moreover, IAEA depends heavily on U.S. financial support to meet its safeguards obligations. As stipulated by its major contributors, the agency's regular budget is limited to zero-real growth. If such constraints continue and IAEA's assumptions about cost neutrality for the new program are not borne out by experience, IAEA will likely turn to the United States for extra contributions to pay for these efforts.
