Summary: Air power clearly achieved many of the objectives of Operation Desert Storm, but fell short of fully achieving others. GAO's declassified review of available data indicate that many postwar claims by manufacturers and the Defense Department (DOD) about the performance of sophisticated weapon systems--particularly the F-117, the Tomahawk land attack missile, and laser-guided bombs-- were overstated, misleading, inconsistent with the data, or unverifiable. Air power damage to several major targets was less than that suggested in a Defense Department (DOD) report to Congress. The lessons learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions, the strike tactics used by the coalition, the limited Iraqi response, and the limited data on weapon system effectiveness. The climate and terrain were generally conducive to air strikes, and the coalition had nearly six months to plan the operation. The strong likelihood of success allowed U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that emphasized pilot and aircraft survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness. In addition, the Iraqis employed few, if any, electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition. As a result, Desert Storm did not rigorously test aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign.
