Summary: Lax export controls and unclear jurisdiction at federal agencies may put sensitive stealth technology into the hands of foreign governments, enabling them to build weapons capable of evading detection by U.S. radar systems. Also, under current interagency referral practices, the Defense Department does not review most license applications for stealth technology processed by the Commerce Department. This report (1) determines how control over stealth technology is split between the State Department's U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Department's Control List, (2) identifies the impact of shared jurisdiction over stealth-related items, and (3) assesses whether current referral procedures enable the Defense Department to review all stealth-related exports. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Export Controls: Issues Concerning Sensitive Stealth-Related Items and Technologies, by David E. Cooper, Director of Acquisition Policy, Technology, and Competitiveness Issues, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. GAO/T-NSIAD-95-158, May 11, 1995 (13 pages).
