Summary: During Operation Desert Storm, a large coalition tanker fleet shipped more than 700 million pounds of fuel during roughly 50,000 refuelings to about 2,000 aircraft. Although these results suggest a notable success, it must also be acknowledged that an average of nearly 40 percent of the fuel carried by Air Force tankers went unused. This degree of inefficiency prevented more combat missions from being supported, a frustrating situation for operational planners. It also suggests that more tankers were supporting operations than were needed on the basis of fuel requirements alone. The policy of giving priority to refueling strategic bombers left a gap in both the capability and knowledge necessary to support a large conventional contingency. Accordingly, the tanker force faces several challenges as it switches from a predominately conventional role. The Pentagon will have to decide, in light of the smaller post-Cold War force, the proper size and capability of the tanker fleet. Although Desert Storm may not be a prototype for future tanker operations, it offers lessons that may be helpful in making that decision.
