Summary: The program to develop the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System--intended to display tactical information, such as the position of enemy targets, on terminals in fighter aircraft and ground-based command centers--has experienced fluctuations in the number of terminals needed, reflecting uncertainty about the Pentagon's joint system needs and priority. Specifically, the Air Force revised its plan to equip F-15 aircraft with the terminals and the Army virtually eliminated its involvement in the program, then later reversed its position. In 1989 the Defense Department (DOD) decided to begin low-rate initial production of the system despite unsatisfactory test results and recommendations that production be delayed. A Navy-Air Force decision in 1991 to continue low-rate production for a second year was not based on adequate testing. Although testing in 1992 revealed alarming system deficiencies, production continued. The two criteria essential for justifying system production--operational effectiveness and suitability--have yet to be satisfactorily demonstrated. In addition, the system's cost-effectiveness is questionable because of (1) the uncertainty associated with DOD's joint system needs and priority; (2) unsatisfactory test results; and (3) plans for the smaller, lighter weight, and less costly Multifunctional Information Distribution System.
