Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Chemical Defense Program, focusing on whether the Army adequately trained and equipped its forces to survive and sustain operations in a chemical environment.
GAO found that: (1) many soldiers in 36 active and 4 reserve Army units believed that their training did not meet the minimum time standards and that the Army did not implement training under realistic conditions or integrate mission training exercises; (2) Army evaluations of exercises at its two main combat training centers indicated that the units did not stress chemical training, did not perform well, and sustained heavy simulated casualties; (3) although the Army updated and attempted to refine its chemical warfare doctrine, branch schools did not integrate the updated doctrine; (4) three reserve units lacked adequate equipment to survive and sustain operations in a chemical warfare environment; (5) in Europe, stock levels in theatre reserves and prepositioned equipment storage sites sustained major shortages of collective protection shelters, decontamination apparatus, chemical alarms, and individual protection gear; and (6) although the Army developed and produced new chemical defense equipment, shortages of certain items continued to hinder its ability to effectively carry out sustained operations during a chemical attack.
