Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the acquisition management of selected data fusion efforts within the Navy Command and Control System to identify data fusion deficiencies and evaluate plans to overcome them.
GAO found that: (1) in 1982, the Navy awarded a contract to improve its ashore data fusion capabilities by acquiring an upgrade to the Ocean Surveillance Information System; (2) the Navy initiated the upgrade production before performing an operational evaluation that subsequently identified numerous system deficiencies; (3) the Navy restructured its plans to correct the deficiencies and incorporate additional system capabilities by 1993, delaying the program completion date by 4 years; (4) the Navy acquired several prototype systems to overcome the data fusion deficiencies, but those systems did not meet the Navy's needs or satisfy its documentation, logistics support, testing, training, and configuration control program requirements; (5) the Navy's failure to meet mission needs or satisfy various program requirements was partially attributable to the lack of effective systems engineering and integration and an ineffective organizational management structure; (6) the Navy's inadequate data fusion capabilities resulted in inefficient or untimely use of sensors and battle group weapons; and (7) until adequate data fusion capabilities both ashore and afloat become available, Navy battle group commanders will have less than a satisfactory tactical picture for decisionmaking, placing Navy missions at risk.
