Summary: GAO discussed the Army's ability to mobilize and move forces to ports of debarkation within the time frames of its operational plans, including: (1) the availability of the required transportation resources; and (2) the adequacy of unit and installation plans and preparations to use them.
GAO found that: (1) because the Army has not identified what equipment it needs to move to mobilization stations, identifying the number or types of transportation resources it needs is difficult; (2) mobilization station commanders and transportation operating agencies believe that the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS) is inaccurate and outdated; (3) the outloading capability of mobilization stations varies from the Military Traffic Management Command's (MTMC) requirements; (4) deterioration of rail lines impedes movement of units to and from mobilization stations; (5) the Army has not determined mobilization stations' out-load capacities and capabilities to receive, off-load, and return transportation resources; (6) the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) overstated its requirements for blocking, bracing, packing, crating, and tie-down (BBPCT) materials and warehouses by about $10 million; and (7) FORSCOM overstated its needs for railcar spanners, hand tool sets, and loading ramps by $5.5 million.
