Summary: GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) administration of the nuclear export controls the Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act require. GAO found that: (1) rather than adopting nonproliferation standards for making specific authorization determinations, DOE weighs six factors in making export decisions; (2) four of the factors are similar to Nuclear Regulatory Commission standards; and (3) the other two factors address the availability of technology from other sources and U.S. political, economic, and security interests. GAO also found that: (1) until 1983, DOE did not have procedures for determining when an export involved the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology (SNT); (2) on 11 occasions from 1980 to 1983, the Secretary of Energy approved exports of equipment and information related to sensitive facilities, including lasers for uranium enrichment research and DOE assistance to foreign reprocessing efforts; and (3) in eight of those cases, DOE did not review the proposed exports to determine whether they included SNT. GAO identified seven new analyses that were not publicly available, which DOE authorized for export under the general authorization provision for information related to sensitive nuclear facilities. GAO further found that the other problems that limit effective administration of DOE export control regulations are the lack of: (1) clarity on what types of export activities require specific authorization; (2) requirements that persons report when authorized activities have been completed; and (3) public disclosure of information on authorized exports.
