Summary: In response to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle vulnerability test results and commented on their validity.
GAO found that the Army's phase I test results did not provide a realistic picture of the Bradley M3 vehicle's vulnerability or the number of casualties likely in combat because the Army: (1) obtained insufficient information to make such assessments; (2) used only a limited amount of the updated information obtained in preparing its report; (3) included no information regarding expected casualties or catastrophic kills in the event of missile or projectile hits on the Bradley; and (4) established test conditions that influenced the outcome to indicate less vulnerability. GAO compared the monitoring official's evaluation of the Bradley's tests with the Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress and found that the test official reported that: (1) most antiarmor weapons inflicted considerable damage and ammunition stored on the vehicle would present a major hazard to the crew; (2) the Army avoided catastrophic loss by aiming shots away from critical areas; (3) he used numbers of casualties per shot as the primary vulnerability measure rather than vehicle damage; and (4) the aluminum armor's vaporifics effect and halon gas could prove hazardous. GAO concluded that the phase I test results provided insight into the Bradley's vulnerability, but critical data from the Army's vulnerability models are needed for proper assessment.
