Summary: GAO reported on its role in the impoundment control process. Since the passage of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, GAO has been heavily involved in the operation of the Act as the agency statutorily responsible for reviewing and reporting presidential impoundments to Congress. Specifically, GAO receives copies of special messages from the President, containing one or more proposed impoundments, which he has transmitted to Congress. GAO then issues reports which inform Congress of the facts surrounding the proposed impoundments and their probable effects. In addition, GAO reports on the legal sufficiency of those proposals. The Act also authorizes the Comptroller General to report to Congress any impoundments which the President has failed to report or has misclassified. Additionally, the Comptroller General is authorized to sue the Executive to compel the release of impounded funds when such a release is required by the Act. GAO believes that the basic framework of the Act is sound; however, in the interest of clarifying the Act and simplifying its operation, GAO has suggested the consideration of an alternative proposal which would change the basic procedures under the Act while retaining the balanced relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Under the alternative, provisions concerning rescissions would be repealed and all withholding of funds would be proposed as deferrals, with the President indicating which of the deferred budget authorities he wished to have rescinded. The alternative would also amend the current law to: (1) require, for each deferral of fiscal year funds, that the President specify a date beyond which it would be impractical to obligate the funds involved; and (2) require that the funds be made available for obligation on the specified date if there has been no final legislative action on a request to have budget authority rescinded. The GAO alternative retains two basic elements of the present Act: (1) rescission would result only with the concurrence of both Houses of Congress, and (2) withholdings of budget authority may be defeated by either House.
