TERRORISM: MIDDLE EASTERN GROUPS AND STATE SPONSORS, 1998 (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Aug. 27, 1998 |
| Report Number |
98-722 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Kenneth Katzman, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, Iran and terrorist groups it sponsors have been responsible
for
the most politically significant acts of Middle Eastern terrorism. In late 1997, signs began to appear
that major factions within Iran want to change Iran's image from a backer of terrorism to a
constructive force in the region. If this trend in Iran takes hold, there is a chance that state-sponsored
Middle Eastern terrorism will decline over time as Iran moves away from active opposition to the
Arab-Israeli peace process.
The Arab-Israeli peace process is a longstanding major U.S. foreign policy initiative, and the
Administration and Congress pay particularly close attention to terrorist groups and state sponsors
that oppose it. Islamist groups such as Hamas have largely displaced secular, nationalist groups as
the most active anti-peace process organizations. Hamas has become stronger politically since its
founder was released from an Israeli prison in October 1997, but acts of terrorism by Hamas and its
allies have declined since mid-1997, possibly because of greater anti-terrorism vigilance by the
Palestinian Authority.
Over the past few years, radical Islamic groups have increasingly sought to oust pro-U.S.
regimes
and gain removal of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf. This is the chief goal of independent
terrorist financier and chieftain, Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin. Bin Ladin, the independently-
financed leader of a broad terrorist coalition, receives safehaven in Afghanistan and, thus far in
1998, he has been outspoken in support of attacks on U.S. troops in the Middle East. The
Administration contends it has convincing evidence that bin Ladin's network was involved in the
August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, prompting August 20
military action against his bases in Afghanistan. His officially-sanctioned presence in Afghanistan
could lead that country, at some point, to be placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.
U.S. policy to counter Middle Eastern terrorism operates on several different levels. U.S.
counterterrorism policy has generally been directed against state sponsors, which are readily
identifiable targets. A problem for U.S. policy has been how to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism
policies with those of U.S. allies. Most allied governments believe that engaging these countries
diplomatically might sometimes be more effective than trying to isolate or punish them, but U.S.
officials believe that economic and political pressure against states sponsoring terrorism has made
some of these states more cautious.
In recent Executive orders and legislation, the Administration and Congress have stepped up
efforts to directly pressure terrorists and terrorist groups, some of which obtain support and funding
from persons living in the United States. In October 1997, under a 1996 anti-terrorism law, the
Administration formally named 30 groups, half of which are Middle Eastern, as terrorist groups,
barring them from having a presence in the United States. The August 20, 1998 military strikes on
bin Ladin's network suggests that military action might play an increasing role in U.S. efforts to
combat individual terrorist groups.
