Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy? (CRS Report for Congress)
Premium Purchase PDF for $24.95 (54 pages)
add to cart or
subscribe for unlimited access
Pro Premium subscribers have free access to our full library of CRS reports.
Subscribe today, or
request a demo to learn more.
| Release Date |
Oct. 21, 1996 |
| Report Number |
96-844 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Of all the functions of the United States Intelligence Community, covert actions tend to receive
the
greatest attention, even though they consume only a small proportion of intelligence budgets. They
are often controversial and have on several occasions figured prominently in major political scandals.
Almost inevitably, they intrude upon another country's internal affairs and can result in the loss of
human life. They are by definition secret and thus do not undergo the public review and debate that
is a hallmark of democratic society.
Most covert actions undertaken in the four decades after World War II were part of larger
policies designed to contain the Soviet Union and other communist countries. With the end of the
Cold War, the role of covert actions is being reassessed. Some observers have called for a halt to
such efforts, while others have advocated different types of covert capabilities to counter the designs
of rogue states, international terrorist groups, and narcotics smugglers.
For many years covert actions were often undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
without congressional approval or notification, but since the mid-1970s the executive branch has
been required to provide increasingly detailed information to congressional intelligence committees
on planned and ongoing covert actions. Some Members have sought to require congressional
notification prior to the initiation of any covert action (or, in emergencies, within 48 hours of
initiation), but presidents have thus far successfully resisted such a requirement. Congress can
nonetheless use the power of the purse to halt covert actions and, on several occasions, has done so.
A number of proposals have been offered to improve U.S. capabilities to plan and undertake
covert actions in the post-Cold War world. Most address the complicated relationship between CIA's
Directorate of Operations and the rest of the Intelligence Community. Attention is also being given
to the difficulties involved in maintaining capabilities for conducting covert actions against myriad
targets in disparate locales. At present, however, no clearcut consensus for changes has emerged.
A review of covert actions suggests that most were not isolated initiatives, but components of
larger U.S. policies. The extent to which they contributed to making those policies effective is
subject to debate in almost all cases. Some observers continue to be concerned that covert actions
are not adequately considered in the context of their place within a larger policy framework.
Covert actions are usually undertaken in peacetime by the CIA, but the Defense Department and
the military services often provide important support. (Covert actions by law enforcement agencies
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency are excluded from
this discussion.) The line between special operations conducted by military personnel and covert
actions is not always clear and a potential exists for misunderstandings between Congress and the
executive branch regarding reporting requirements for each.
