Authority to Launch Nuclear Forces (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Dec. 19, 2024 |
| Report Number |
IF10521 |
| Report Type |
In Focus |
| Authors |
Amy F. Woolf |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
can seek advice from his senior military leaders; those
military leaders are then required to transmit and implement
the orders authorizing nuclear use if the President decides
to employ nuclear weapons. As General John Hyten stated
in a congressional confirmation hearing, his job as the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
would be to give advice, while the authority to order a
launch lies with the President.
General Mark Milley, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS), made a similar point in a memorandum he
provided to Congress in September 2021. He stated that he
is a part of the “chain of communication,” in his role as the
President’s primary military advisor, but he is not in the
“chain of command” for authorizing a nuclear launch. He
also stated that, if the President ordered a launch, the CJCS
would participate in a “decision conference” to authenticate
the presidential orders and to ensure that the President was
“fully informed” about the implications of the launch.
The President, however, does not need the concurrence of
either his military leaders or the U.S. Congress to order the
launch of nuclear weapons. Neither the military nor
Congress can overrule these orders. As former
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
written, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
military to execute the order.
