Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah: Conflict and Escalation (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Oct. 25, 2024 |
| Report Number |
IF12770 |
| Report Type |
In Focus |
| Authors |
Jim Zanotti; Clayton Thomas |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
A day after Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization, or FTO) led the October 7, 2023, attacks
against Israel that began their ongoing war, Lebanese
Hezbollah (another FTO) started shooting rockets and
missiles across Lebanon’s border into Israel in a show of
solidarity with Hamas. Since then, Hezbollah and Israel
have regularly exchanged fire across the border, in the latest
phase of their adversarial history. Iran appears to regard
Hezbollah as its most capable partner in its “axis of
resistance” versus Israel, and debate persists regarding the
degree to which Hezbollah acts independently or as Iran’s
proxy.
Since July 2024, Israel-Hezbollah violence has become
more volatile than in the preceding nine months. Separate
U.S.-supported efforts to pause or halt fighting in Gaza and
at the Lebanon border have not produced a clear
breakthrough. September 2024 covert attacks attributed to,
but not claimed by, Israel resulted in the explosion of
electronic devices reportedly acquired by Hezbollah. The
explosions reportedly killed tens and injured thousands in
Lebanon, including some civilians. Hezbollah has vowed to
retaliate, and Israel has announced a shift of some of its
military forces from Gaza to the Lebanese border area.
Subsequent signs of escalation, including an Israeli airstrike
on September 20 in Beirut that the Israeli government says
killed several senior Hezbollah officials, may increase the
prospects of broader war. Hezbollah’s large arsenal of
drones, rockets, and missiles (see Figure 1) could threaten
Israeli strategic sites and population centers, and Israel
could strike throughout Lebanon, with potentially
devastating consequences to its institutions and society.
Wider-scale war could prompt Israel to seek additional U.S.
material support or direct military involvement, with major
implications for U.S. national security interests in the
region.
Even if Hezbollah were to agree to halt attacks, perhaps in
connection with an Israel-Hamas cease-fire, Israeli leaders
insist that Hezbollah’s fighters must be kept back from the
border to mitigate the threat of an October 7-style attack
there. Violence to date has displaced some 60,000 Israeli
and 95,000 Lebanese civilians from their homes near the
border. In September, Israel’s cabinet added the goal of
returning evacuated Israelis to its official war objectives.
While Israel retains conventional military superiority in the
region, some Israeli and U.S. analysts have assessed that
Hezbollah could be capable of overwhelming, depleting, or
targeting Israeli air defense systems via massive projectile
volleys—some of which may include precision guidance.
Dismantling Hezbollah’s military capacity in Lebanon may
be more difficult than doing so against Hamas’s forces in
Gaza, partly due to Hezbollah’s considerable defensive
capabilities in Lebanon’s varied terrain and the wider
geographic dispersal of Hezbollah’s assets and personnel.
