U.N. Rapid Reaction Force? A Discussion of the Issues and Considerations for U.S. Policymakers (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
June 29, 1995 |
| Report Number |
95-787 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Nina M. Serafino, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently called for Member States to consider
creating a special U.N. force for U.N. peacekeeping operations. In
a January 1995 report he proposed that the U.N. consider establishing a "strategic reserve" rapid
reaction force (RRF), perhaps of battalion-sized units, to deploy when emergency needs for
peacekeeping troops arise. They would be stationed in their home countries, but would be trained to
the standards, use the same operating procedures and equipment, participate in regular joint exercises,
and otherwise be maintained at a high state of readiness in order to respond quickly to a U.N. call
for their deployment.
Although proposals for a U.N. force dedicated to peace operations were made
by former presidents Bush and Reagan, and by presidential candidate William J. Clinton, the
Clinton
Administration backed away from the concept. In its May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25
(PDD-25), the Administration stated that the United States "does not support a standing U.N.
army..." The Clinton Administration supported, however, the establishment of the U.N. Standby
Forces system, through which Member States formally commit individuals and units to be provided
within a specified period of a U.N. request for peacekeeping assistance, in order to enable the U.N.
to structure peacekeeping forces more effectively. (The United States has not "earmarked" troops
in advance for the system, but has provided a list of specific military capabilities that could be made
available for peacekeeping operations.)
The Secretary-General's RRF proposal raises many concerns among U.N. Member States,
particularly whether it is politically desirable and financially feasible. A February 1995 consensus
statement of the U.N. Security Council on the Secretary-General's report did not specifically mention
the rapid reaction force proposal. It stressed the "importance of improving the capacity of the U.N.
for rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations," and stated that the first priority "should be
the further enhancement of the existing standby arrangements...."
There are many factors -- and problems -- to be considered in creating an effective "on-call"
rapid reaction force. Among these are how to provide effective command and control, intelligence
collection and processing, and adequate, cost-effective logistics support. For the United States, there
are broad strategic, budgetary, political, and military implications, as well. The Clinton Administration
has opposed the idea of a RRF because it would reduce the flexibility of U.S. strategic planning, and
could compromise the United States' ability to respond to other crises. The United States might be
called upon to bear a significant part of the cost of maintaining a RRF, which could be high, but must
be weighed against savings that might accrue from have a force to deploy before conflict escalates
and becomes more costly to contain. Among the domestic political considerations of establishing an
RRF is the possible reduction of congressional and other domestic input into the decision-making
process on peacekeeping operations. Among the issues for the U.S. military is whether the U.N.
would rely on the United States' unique lift capabilities to deploy the RRF.
