Intelligence Implications of the Military Technical Revolution (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
May 1, 1995 |
| Report Number |
95-560 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
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The availability of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and precise intelligence transmitted in
"real time" lies at the center of a military technical revolution that is changing the ways in which
future military operations are likely to be planned and conducted. This revolution requires changes
in the functions and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
During the decades of the Cold War, intelligence agencies were organized around collection
disciplines, e.g., signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and human intelligence.
Collection
efforts were managed by Washington-based agencies, principally, the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence
Agency. Their efforts were largely (but by not means exclusively) directed towards supporting
senior policymakers in dealing with the threat from the Soviet Union. Support to military operations
was provided by service intelligence organizations using information that became available from
national-level agencies.
The Persian Gulf War, which occurred just as the Soviet Union was collapsing, saw the
dispatch of PGMs to destroy specific targets without extensive collateral damage and injuries to
noncombatants. This capability stands in sharp contrast to the area bombing campaigns of World
War II and Vietnam. This success occurred even though many intelligence systems and
communications links were not designed to provide extensive real-time support to lower echelons
of military commands. It was possible in large measure because analysts in Washington and military
staffs in the Gulf commands devised innovative uses of existing intelligence and communications
systems.
Subsequently, the Intelligence Community, with congressional support and encouragement, is
being restructured to ensure that support to military commanders assigned regional and peacekeeping
missions has a high priority. Relationships between national and tactical systems are being
rationalized. New surveillance equipment and communications links are being procured. Personnel
are being trained to draw upon all the resources of the Intelligence Community to provide real-time
support to military operations.
There are major challenges remaining, however, to ensure that this process of intelligence
"tacticalization" goes smoothly, that interoperability among equipment used by different services and
intelligence agencies is achieved, and that a reasonable relationship between force structure,
intelligence and communications "architectures," and likely operational missions in the uncertain
post-Cold War world is maintained. Some observers have also expressed concern that national
intelligence not be neglected as necessary adaptations to the military technical revolution are
implemented.
