Partnership for Peace (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Aug. 9, 1994 |
| Report Number |
94-351 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Paul E. Gallis, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
NATO's Partnership for Peace program seeks to encourage eligible states, above all the states
of the
former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, to build democracy and undertake greater
responsibilities in international security. The program could open the door to, but does not promise,
NATO membership. U.S. and NATO relations with Russia are likely to be the determining factor in
deciding whether states move from Partnership to NATO membership.
The Partnership program, established at NATO's summit of January 10-11, 1994, does not
extend the Alliance's mutual security commitment to members. The program requires that member
states take steps towards an open defense budget and civilian control of the military, and urges them
to join with NATO in future peacekeeping efforts. It establishes an institutional structure in Brussels
for consultation with NATO states. As of August 3, 1994, 22 states had joined.
The Clinton Administration and NATO's initially stated intent was that Partnership members
would bear the brunt of the program's costs, with Alliance members contributing little. President
Clinton may alter this course, however, as he has said he would seek $100 million for the program
in the FY1996 budget.
Russia will likely play a pivotal role in the program's success or failure. Russia, a Partnership
adherent, could use its membership as a step to strengthen cooperation with the Alliance and former
members of the Warsaw Pact by joining in peacekeeping operations and encouraging diplomatic
settlements of international disputes. Some observers, however, believe that the program opens the
door to Moscow's interference in the affairs of other Partnership states.
Several east European governments express concern that NATO, by allowing Russia into the
Partnership for Peace, has established a "soft Yalta", in which Moscow can influence their future.
They believe that the United States and its allies may wish above all to avoid tension with Russia and
accede, for example, to Russian efforts to dissuade the Alliance from ever allowing their entry into
NATO.
Some critics of the Partnership program believe that it may deflect the effort to build a European
security apparatus, by providing Moscow with opportunities to influence NATO decisionmaking
more directly than in the past, and by diverting European states from developing new security
institutions at a moment when the United States is reducing its military presence on the continent.
In response, the Administration contends that the end of the Cold War presents an historic
opportunity to include Russia in building a democratic Europe in which major security decisions are
made in concert, rather than across ideological or battle lines, and that the Partnership for Peace is
a vehicle for such decisionmaking. They also point out that no credible alternative institution to
NATO exists to insure European security.
