Managed Trade and Quantitative Restrictions: Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Aug. 9, 2024 |
| Report Number |
IF11035 |
| Report Type |
In Focus |
| Authors |
Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Andres B. Schwarzenberg |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
-
Premium Revised Feb. 22, 2024 (3 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Revised Jan. 3, 2023 (2 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Revised Dec. 22, 2022 (2 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Revised Jan. 25, 2022 (3 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Revised Dec. 14, 2020 (120 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Revised Aug. 18, 2020 (3 pages, $24.95)
add
-
Premium Dec. 3, 2018 (2 pages, $24.95)
add
|
Summary:
Congress plays a prominent role in shaping U.S. trade
policy, due in part to trade policy’s impact on the overall
health of the U.S. economy and specific sectors, the success
of U.S. businesses and workers, and Americans’ standard of
living. Some Members of Congress contend that past trade
negotiations and agreements have failed to address
effectively foreign protectionist practices and enhance
reciprocal market access for U.S. firms, farmers, and
workers. They cite as evidence the disruption of some U.S.
industries, difficulties of U.S. firms in penetrating some
foreign markets, and large U.S. merchandise trade
deficits—even with countries with which the United States
has a free trade agreement. They argue that the main goals
of U.S. trade policy should be to achieve “fair” and
“balanced” trade and to place more emphasis on measurable
results (e.g., increased exports and market share abroad).
To some observers, the United States has been pursuing—
in certain areas—a “managed trade” policy that seeks
specific or numerical outcomes of trade by using, among
other things, the size of the U.S. economy as leverage. The
concept drew attention in the 1980s and early 1990s in
reaction to proposals and actions by Congress and the
Reagan and Clinton Administrations to address the large
U.S. trade deficit with Japan and the market-entry
restrictions faced by U.S. firms there. Critics contend that
the most recent manifestations of a managed trade approach
by the Trump and Biden Administrations are the quotas
negotiated in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA) on autos (through side letter agreements); the
quota arrangements that have allowed certain U.S. steel and
aluminum imports from South Korea, Brazil, Argentina,
and more recently, the European Union, Japan, and the
United Kingdom, avoid U.S. tariff increases stemming from
the use of Section 232; and more prominently, the “Phase
One Agreement” with China, which committed China to
increase purchases of U.S. goods and services by no less
than $200 billion between 2020 and 2021.
Today, some proponents of this approach argue, as they did
three decades ago, that many trading partners are not
fulfilling their trade obligations or that current trade rules
do not address many barriers and distortive practices.
Therefore, the most effective way to promote U.S.
economic interests, they argue, is to pressure countries to
agree to specific trade results.
As the Biden Administration implements or seeks to
enforce recent trade agreements and quota arrangements,
the implications of this approach may be of interest to
Members of Congress.
