LegiStorm

Summary:

In August 2012, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced that the government was engaged in exploratory peace talks with the violent leftist insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in a bid to resolve a nearly 50-year internal armed conflict. The secret, initial dialogue between the Santos government and the FARC's leadership led to the opening of formal peace talks with the FARC—the oldest, largest, and best-financed guerrilla organization in Latin America. Formal talks began in Oslo, Norway, in October 2012 and then, as planned, moved to Havana, Cuba, where they continued for more than 50 rounds. Despite more than three years of negotiations, the leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño, alias "Timochenko," had not met publicly with President Santos. In September 2015, the two leaders shook hands in a televised meeting and announced that the negotiating parties would reach a final accord no later than March 23, 2016. However, that deadline, as many others before it, went unmet. By the end of 2015, the most difficult issue in the peace talks' agenda, outlined in a framework agreement, was resolved. Government and FARC negotiators reached a partial agreement on victims of the conflict, providing a comprehensive system for reparations, justice, truth and guarantees for non-repetition and outlining a transitional justice system. In late January 2016, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council adopted Resolution 2261, stating that a U.N. mission would monitor and verify a definitive bilateral cease-fire and cessation of hostilities between the parties, following the signing of the final peace agreement. Terms for operationalizing the accord were announced in June 2016, when the Santos government and the FARC agreed to a bilateral cease-fire, security guarantees for demobilized guerrillas, mechanisms for dismantling paramilitaries, and the location of demobilization zones. On July 18, 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved a peace plebiscite as the appropriate mechanism for the public to endorse or reject the final agreement arrived at in Havana. The court also determined that the plebiscite vote would be binding for Colombia's executive branch. In a surprise loss, on October 2, 2016, the first accord—known at the Cartagena Agreement—was rejected in a peace plebiscite, defeated by 54,000 votes out of 13 million ballots cast. In November 2016, the government and the FARC signed a second accord, which the government maintained responded to criticisms of the "No" campaign leaders, who objected to the first accord. The Colombian Congress approved the second accord, and the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld the fast-track mechanism that would have allowed rapid implementation of the Cartagena Agreement was upheld to apply to the second accord on December 13, 2016. The Santos Administration had anticipated the peace process with the FARC by proposing several legislative reforms that were enacted in the first years of Santos's first term (2010-2012), including a law to restitute victims of the conflict and a "peace framework" law. In addition, the warming of relations with neighboring countries, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, helped to lay the groundwork for the peace process. Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, and Norway also actively supported the process, which most countries in the region have lauded. The U.S. Congress remains deeply interested in Colombia's political future, as the country has become one of the United States' closest allies in Latin America. Congress has expressed that interest by its continued investment in Colombia's security and stability. Over the years, the U.S.-Colombian relationship has broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns; justice reform and human rights; and economic development, investment, and trade. Peace Colombia, the assistance program proposed by the Obama Administration, foresaw a peace accord with the insurgents building on many gestures of support made by the Administration. The initiative was designed to help Colombia secure peace with $450 million of support, $391 million of which was requested in the FY2017 congressional budget justification. A continuing resolution passed by Congress on December 9, 2016, funds assistance programs to Colombia at slightly below the FY2016 level ($300 million) through April 28, 2017, after the 115th Congress takes office. This report provides background on Colombia's armed conflict and describes its key players. The report briefly analyzes prior negotiations with the FARC and the lessons learned from those efforts. It examines what transpired during the preparatory negotiations and four years of formal talks that led to the final accord with the FARC. The report also examines some of the constraints that could limit the success of the peace accord's implementation and the possible influence of implementation on future U.S.-Colombian relations.