Encryption and the "Going Dark" Debate (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
Revised Jan. 25, 2017 |
Report Number |
R44481 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Kristin Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
Changing technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some
technological advances have arguably opened a treasure trove of information for investigators and
analysts; others have presented unique hurdles. While some feel that law enforcement now has
more information available to them than ever before, others contend that law enforcement is
“going dark” as their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change.
These hurdles for law enforcement include strong, end-to-end (or what law enforcement has
sometimes called “warrant-proof”) encryption; provider limits on data retention; bounds on
companies’ technological capabilities to provide specific data points to law enforcement; tools
facilitating anonymity online; and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks
through which individuals and information are constantly passing. As such, law enforcement
cannot access certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. Much of the
current debate surrounds how strong encryption contributes to the going dark issue, and thus it is
the focus of this report.
The tension between law enforcement capabilities and technological change has received
congressional attention for several decades. For instance, in the 1990s the “crypto wars” pitted the
government against technology companies, and this tension was highlighted by proposals to build
in back doors to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to restrict the export of
strong encryption code. In addition, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414) in 1994 to help law enforcement maintain their ability
to execute authorized electronic surveillance as telecommunications providers turned to digital
and wireless technology.
The going dark debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement’s ability to
intercept real-time communications. However, more recent technology changes have impacted
law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications but stored content, or data at
rest. As such, a central element of the debate now involves determining what types of information
law enforcement is able to access and under what circumstances. Cell phones have advanced
from being purely cellular telecommunications devices into mobile computers that happen to
have phone capabilities; concurrently, the scope of data produced by and saved on these devices
has morphed. In addition to voice communications, this range of data can include call detail
records, Global Positioning System (GPS) location points, data stored on the devices (including
emails and photos), and data stored in the “cloud.” Some of these data can be obtained directly
from telecommunications providers or individuals, and some may be obtained without going
through such a middle man.
The Administration has taken steps to urge the technology community to develop a means to
assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted data and has taken steps to bolster law enforcement
capabilities. In addition, policymakers have been evaluating whether legislation may be a
necessary or appropriate element in the current debate on going dark—particularly on the
encryption aspect. A range of legislative options exist that could impact law enforcement
capabilities or resources. Legislation could also place certain requirements on technology
companies or individuals utilizing certain communications systems and devices. In debating these
options, policymakers may consider a number of questions, including the following:
How effective might mandating law enforcement access to products or services
manufactured, sold, or otherwise used in the United States be, given the
borderless nature of modern communications?
Is it possible to create a system with sufficiently narrow and protected access
points that these points can only be entered by authorized entities and not
exploited by others?
What is the appropriate balance for personal privacy and data security with
public safety and national security?
What precedents might be set for U.S. companies operating both domestically
and internationally if the United States mandates the ability for law enforcement
to access encrypted data and communications?