Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Nov. 14, 1997 |
| Report Number |
97-1022 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Several rationales may explain the development of Chinese nuclear weapons. These include
international benefits (nuclear weapons may enhance security, influence, and prestige);
technology
(warhead development is constrained to certain paths by technological imperatives regardless of
leadership or doctrinal preferences); doctrine (recent Chinese thinking may envision
broadening
nuclear weapons' role); and others. These rationales may have shifted in salience, with international
benefits dominant early on and doctrine becoming more influential over time.
Data on China's nuclear test program reveal several points about China's approach to testing
and goals for it. First, China conducted few tests compared to the other nuclear weapon states, and
tested at a stable rate. Second, its highest-yield tests were conducted early in its test program, after
which time the yield dropped sharply. Third, for tests with a yield of roughly 100 kilotons or less,
yield dropped in 1972-1992. Thereafter, though, it increased, possibly in support of development
of new warheads for new forces. Fourth, an analysis of the locations of Chinese underground tests,
and the geology of those sites, casts little light on the purpose of tests prior to 1990 but strongly
implies that the purpose of subsequent tests was weapons development.
China has reportedly embarked on a major program to upgrade its nuclear forces. Most analysts
anticipate advances in missile accuracy, mobile ballistic missiles, and missile submarine forces, as
well as deployment of multiple-warhead missiles. These advances hinge on warhead advances. In
particular, increasing a warhead's so-called yield-to-weight ratio, i.e., the amount of explosive yield
per unit of warhead weight, allows key improvements in China's nuclear forces that enable a role
for these forces consistent with a doctrine more ambitious than minimum deterrence. Specifically,
advances in yield-to-weight extend missile range, enable deployment of multiple warheads on a
missile, facilitate submarine-launched ballistic missiles and mobile missiles, aid penetration of
ballistic missile defenses, and contribute to accuracy. These advances together would make China's
nuclear forces more survivable while increasing their offensive potential. China is likely to produce
new warheads for these forces for some time, as well as to conduct maintenance and modification
of existing warheads on an ongoing basis.
