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Congressional Power to Create Federal Courts: A Legal Overview (CRS Report for Congress)

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Release Date Revised June 1, 2015
Report Number R43746
Report Type Report
Authors Andrew Nolan, Richard M. Thompson II, Legislative Attorneys
Source Agency Congressional Research Service
Older Revisions
  • Premium   Oct. 1, 2014 (31 pages, $24.95) add
Summary:

The U.S. Constitution established only one federal court—the U.S. Supreme Court. Beyond this, Article III of the Constitution left it to the discretion of Congress to “ordain and establish” lower federal courts to conduct the judicial business of the federal government. From the very first, Congress established a host of different federal tribunals to adjudicate a variety of legal disputes. The two central types of federal “courts”—courts established under Article III and those tribunals that are not—differ in many respects, including with regard to their personnel, purposes, and powers. Courts established pursuant to Article III are mainly defined by the three central constitutional provisions to which they are subject: resolution of cases that only present live “cases or controversies,” lifetime tenure, and salary protection. The primary purpose for these safeguards was to insulate the federal judiciary from potential pressures, from either the political branches or the public, which might improperly influence the judicial decision-making process. Notwithstanding Article III’s seemingly literal command that the “judicial power” shall extend to all cases “arising under” the Constitution or federal law, Congress has assigned a host of cases arising under federal law to non-Article III bodies. Unlike Article III judges, these bodies, generally referred to as “non-Article III courts,” “legislative courts,” or “Article I courts,” enjoy neither lifetime tenure nor salary protection. There are two main categories of non-Article III courts. The first are standalone courts, created under Congress’s Article I power, which have similar authority as Article III courts, such as entering their own judgments and issuing contempt orders. Examples of legislative courts include the U.S. Tax Court; the Court of Federal Claims; the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and federal district courts in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.The second category of non-Article III tribunals is commonly referred to as “adjuncts” to Article III courts. This category is mainly comprised of federal administrative agencies and magistrate judges. These non-Article III bodies have been justified on several grounds. First, the Court has held that in certain limited instances, Article III’s absolute command must give way to Congress’s exercise of its Article I powers. This theory has been used to justify the creation of territorial courts, military courts, and the adjudication of cases involving rights created by Congress (commonly referred to as “public rights” cases). The second rationale is the use of “adjuncts,” judicial officers who do not function as independent courts but instead act as a subordinate to the federal courts with direct review of their decisions. Examples of adjuncts include the thousands of administrative law judges who adjudicate cases coming before federal agencies and federal magistrate judges who assist district court judges with everything from deciding motions, hearing evidence, and trying both criminal and civil cases. Lastly, certain questions arising under federal law may be resolved by non-Article III tribunals if the parties to the proceeding consent to such an adjudication.