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Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33548 Summary A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, "My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT "education" campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses, or so far in the 114th. As of August 2015, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 164, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified. Eight conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, every other year, most recently on September 27, 2013. In years between these conferences, some foreign ministers meet to promote entry into force of the CTBT, most recently on September 26, 2014. Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945. The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. (Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Since 1997, the United States has held 28 "subcritical experiments" at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in August 2014, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998. The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. Its budget is listed as "Weapons Activities" within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The FY2016 request for Weapons Activities was $8,846.9 million; on a comparable basis, the FY2014 current amount was $7,625.7 million and the FY2015 enacted amount was $8,007.7 million. Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The FY2016 request for the contribution was $33.0 million. This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2016 budget request and developments through mid-August 2015. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, discusses safeguards—unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT. CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship, by Jonathan E. Medalia, provides details on stockpile stewardship. Contents Most Recent Developments 1 History 1 National Positions on Testing and the CTBT 2 The North Korean Nuclear Tests 15 The October 2006 Nuclear Test 15 The May 2009 Nuclear Test 17 A Test in May 2010? 18 The February 2013 Nuclear Test 19 CTBT Negotiations, Provisions, Entry into Force 22 CTBT Negotiations and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 22 Key Provisions of the CTBT 26 International Efforts on Behalf of Entry into Force 31 Budget of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 36 Stockpile Stewardship 37 Stockpile Stewardship and the CTBT 38 Stockpile Stewardship Experiments and Facilities 46 Subcritical Experiments 47 Other Experiments and Experimental Facilities 48 Nuclear Test Readiness 49 CTBT Pros and Cons 53 The National Academy of Sciences Study and Its Critics 54 Chronology 56 For Additional Reading 59 Tables Table 1. Projected Budgets for Weapons Activities, FY2016-FY2020 ($ billions) 46 Table 2. U.S. Nuclear Tests by Calendar Year 53 Appendixes Appendix. Chronology, 1992-2009 66 Contacts Author Contact Information 73 Most Recent Developments The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) held its 2015 Science and Technology Conference from June 22 to 26, 2015, in Vienna, Austria. It is "designed to further enhance the strong relationship between the scientific and technological community and the CTBTO." On June 2, Pakistan reiterated "its consistent stance that it will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing." The 2015 Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was held from April 27 to May 22 in New York. At the conference, over 100 states expressed support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). On May 12-14, 2015, the CTBTO PrepCom and others held a Workshop on Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production. Certain radioactive materials have great medical value, but their production may release radioactive xenon, which is also a signature of nuclear tests. The workshop "explore[d] ways to mitigate the effects on nuclear explosion monitoring of emissions from facilities that produce lifesaving medical isotopes without impacting production." On March 20, 2015, Angola became the 164th state to ratify the CTBT. On February 24, 2015, the CTBTO PrepCom and Ecuador concluded an agreement to build two stations of the International Monitoring System on the Galapagos Islands. The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was held December 8 and 9, 2014, in Vienna, Austria. The final report stated, "A number of delegations argued that a step-by-step approach was the most effective and practical way to achieve nuclear disarmament, referring in particular to the entry into force of the CTBT and a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons." The CTBTO PrepCom conducted IFE14 (Integrated Field Exercise 2014) in Jordan from November 3 to December 9, 2014, to simulate an on-site inspection to detect a clandestine nuclear test. History While the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, it has not entered into force, leaving a ban on nuclear testing as the oldest item on the arms control agenda. Efforts to curtail tests have been made since the 1940s. In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union conducted hundreds of hydrogen bomb tests. The radioactive fallout from these tests spurred worldwide protest. These pressures, plus a desire to improve U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1974, banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150 kilotons, the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, 10 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 150-kiloton limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. President Carter did not pursue ratification of these treaties, preferring to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, a ban on all nuclear explosions. When agreement on a CTBT seemed near, however, he pulled back, bowing to arguments that continued testing was needed to maintain reliability of existing weapons, to develop new weapons, and for other purposes. President Reagan raised concerns about U.S. ability to monitor the two unratified treaties and late in his term started negotiations on new verification protocols. These two treaties were ratified in 1990. With the end of the Cold War, the need for improved warheads dropped and pressures for a CTBT grew. The U.S.S.R. and France began nuclear test moratoria in October 1990 and April 1992, respectively. In early 1992, many in Congress favored a one-year test moratorium. The effort led to the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the FY1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, which banned testing before July 1, 1993, set conditions on a resumption of testing, banned testing after September 1996 unless another nation tested, and required the President to report to Congress annually on a plan to achieve a CTBT by September 30, 1996. President George H. W. Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 102-377) October 2, 1992. The CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. It was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996, and was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of August 2015, 183 states had signed it and 164 had ratified. National Positions on Testing and the CTBT United States: As of August 2015, the United States had signed but not ratified the CTBT. The following history casts light on the U.S. position. Under the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment, President Clinton had to decide whether to ask Congress to resume testing. On July 3, 1993, he said, "A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons," and "the nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable." While testing offered advantages for safety, reliability, and test ban readiness, "the price we would pay in conducting those tests now by undercutting our own nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would resume testing outweighs these benefits." Therefore, he (1) extended the moratorium at least through September 1994; (2) called on other nations to extend their moratoria; (3) said he would direct DOE to "prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress" if another nation tested; (4) promised to "explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the performance of our own weapons"; and (5) pledged to refocus the nuclear weapons laboratories toward technology for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control verification. He extended the moratorium twice more; on January 30, 1995, the Administration announced his decision to extend the moratorium until a CTBT entered into force, assuming it was signed by September 30, 1996. On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate. He asked the Senate to approve it in his State of the Union addresses of 1998 and 1999. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms rejected that request, saying that the treaty "from a non-proliferation standpoint, is scarcely more than a sham" and had low priority for the committee. In summer 1999, Senate Democrats pressed Senators Helms and Lott to permit consideration of the treaty. On September 30, 1999, Senator Lott offered a unanimous-consent request to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from considering the treaty and to have debate and a vote. The request, as modified, was agreed to. The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings October 5-7; the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing October 7. It quickly became clear that the treaty was far short of the votes for approval, leading many on both sides to seek to delay a vote. As the vote was scheduled by unanimous consent, and several Senators opposed a delay, the vote was held October 13, rejecting the treaty, 48 for, 51 against, and 1 present. At the end of the 106th Congress, pursuant to Senate Rule XXX, paragraph 2, the treaty moved to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calendar, where it currently resides. The Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and Nuclear Testing: In the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398, §1041), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to review nuclear policy, strategy, arms control objectives, and the forces, stockpile, and nuclear weapons complex needed to implement U.S. strategy. Although the resulting Nuclear Posture Review is classified, J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, presented an unclassified briefing on it on January 9, 2002, dealing in part with the CTBT and nuclear testing. He stated there would be "no change in the Administration's policy at this point on nuclear testing. We continue to oppose CTBT ratification. We also continue to adhere to a testing moratorium." Further, "DOE is planning on accelerating its test-readiness program" to reduce the time needed between a decision to test and the conduct of a test, which was then 24 to 36 months. He discussed new weapons. "At this point, there are no recommendations in the report about developing new nuclear weapons ... we are trying to look at a number of initiatives. One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against ... hard targets and deeply-buried targets. And we're also looking at non-nuclear ways that we might be able to deal with those problems." A Washington Post article of January 10, 2002, quoted White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer as saying that the President has not ruled out testing "to make sure the stockpile, particularly as it is reduced, is reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so." Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. Physicians for Social Responsibility argued, "The Administration's plan ... would streamline our nuclear arsenal into a war-fighting force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing." Another critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior approval for testing. In July 2002 a National Academy of Sciences panel report on technical aspects of the CTBT concluded, in the words of a press release, "that verification capabilities for the treaty are better than generally supposed, U.S. adversaries could not significantly advance their nuclear weapons capabilities through tests below the threshold of detection, and the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing weapons stockpile without periodic nuclear tests." A U.N. draft document of August 5, 2005, for signature by heads of government and heads of state at the U.N. General Assembly meeting of September 2005, contained a provision that the signers "resolve to ... [m]aintain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and call upon all States to sign and ratify the Treaty." John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, reportedly called for major changes to the draft; the CTBT passage was one of many drawing his objection. On June 25, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: the Administration does not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and does not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification. There has been no change in the Administration's policy on this matter. By reducing the likelihood of the need to return to underground nuclear testing, RRW [the Reliable Replacement Warhead] makes it more likely that the United States would be able to continue its voluntary nuclear testing moratorium. We cannot, however, provide guarantees regarding the voluntary moratorium. We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test. Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547, FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, included the following: While supporting the continued voluntary moratorium on testing, the Administration strongly opposes a provision of section 3122 that calls for the ratification of the CTBT. It would be imprudent to tie the hands of a future administration that may have to conduct a test of an element of an aging, unmodernized stockpile in order to assure the reliability of the nuclear deterrent force. Absent such a test, the United States may not be able to diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical to the Nation's deterrent strategy. The Obama Administration and the CTBT: In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama said, "my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part of our non-proliferation and arms control agenda, and we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asked if the United States should ratify the CTBT, replied, "I think that if there are adequate verification measures, probably should." The Obama Administration released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report in April 2010, which "focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture: Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal." Consistent with Administration statements, the report presented the CTBT as a way to implement the first objective. It called several arms control measures, including the CTBT, "a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide." It viewed ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT as contributing to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. U.S. ratification could also encourage ratification by other states, including China, and provide incentives for the remaining states to work toward entry into force of the treaty. Further, U.S. ratification of the CTBT would enable us to encourage non-NPT Parties to follow the lead of the NPT-recognized Nuclear Weapon States in formalizing a heretofore voluntary testing moratorium, and thus strengthen strategic stability by reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in those states' national defense strategies. The report also called for a substantial effort to maintain nuclear weapons and to upgrade the workforce and physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. Vice President Joseph Biden wrote, "The President has made ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty an Administration priority. He has asked me to guide the Administration's effort to gain Senate support for the treaty." Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher described elements of the Administration's strategy to win Senate approval of the treaty. "This administration will not attempt to [seek ratification] unless we believe it can actually pass.... [We are] laying the groundwork for the support of a supermajority in the Senate, 67 votes.... We [will] have a very, very short window to talk about CTBT. But when we believe that we have the right conditions, we will begin to engage the Senate." Obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratification has proven to be a challenge. Senator John Kerry, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, "I will begin working to build the necessary bipartisan support for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ... success would be the single greatest arms control accomplishment for the new Senate and it would reestablish America's traditional leadership role on nonproliferation." On the other hand, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said, "I also disagree with the administration's recent pledge to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." The timeline for Senate consideration of the CTBT is uncertain. The Administration decided to press for Senate approval of the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) before trying to bring up the CTBT. However, New START fell behind schedule. The treaty it replaced, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), expired in December 2009. President Obama signed the new treaty in April 2010 and submitted it to the Senate in May. The Senate Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Intelligence held hearings on New START, and the Foreign Relations Committee reported it favorably. President Obama reportedly made securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of New START one of his top priorities for the lame duck session of Congress. The Senate passed the resolution of ratification for that treaty on December 22, 2010, 71-26. Subsequently, Administration officials turned more attention to the CTBT. For example, on September 23, 2011, Ellen Tauscher, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, "we have begun the process of engaging the Senate. We like to think of our efforts as an information exchange' and are working to get these facts [on verification and stockpile stewardship capabilities] out to members and staff, many of whom have never dealt with this Treaty." On September 26, 2012, Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, "As we look towards ratification of the CTBT, we acknowledge that the process will not be easy. That said, the New START ratification process reinvigorated interest in the topic of nuclear weapons and arms control on Capitol Hill. I am optimistic that interest will continue as we engage with Members and staff on this Treaty." On September 15, 2014, Gottemoeller, who had been confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, Now, I will pivot to the question that is asked each and every time this Treaty is discussed: "What is the plan for Senate ratification?" The answer is simple. First comes education, and then comes discussion and last and most importantly, comes debate. It is only through that process that you get to a place where a vote could happen. We are reintroducing this Treaty to the American public, since it has been quite some time it has been discussed outside the Capital Beltway. We are and will continue to outline the clear and convincing facts about our ability to maintain the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing and our ability to effectively monitor and verify Treaty compliance. Both Secretary Moniz and General Klotz have spoken about these two issues this afternoon and they are strong allies in this effort. We are and will continue to make it clear that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing will hinder regional arms races and impede advancements in nuclear stockpiles around the world. With an emphasis on a healthy, open dialogue, rather than a timeline, we are working with the Senate to re-familiarize Members with the Treaty. A lot of CTBT-related issues have changed since 1999, but the Senate has changed a lot since then, too. It is up to us, as policymakers and experts before the American people, to practice due diligence in consideration of this Treaty – that means briefings, hearings at the appropriate time, more briefings, trips to Labs, trips to Vienna and the CTBTO, more briefings, etc., etc.. The Senators should have every opportunity to ask questions, many questions, until they are satisfied. I want to make one thing very clear: this Administration has no intention of rushing this or demanding premature action before we have had a thorough and rigorous discussion and debate. In addressing the Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the CTBT in September 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry said, "So I come here to reiterate the Obama Administration's unshakable commitment to seeing this treaty ratified and entered into force. And though we have not yet succeeded in ratifying it for pure political, ideological reasons—not substance, I assure you—we nevertheless are pledged to live by it, and we do live by it, and we will live by it." In the run-up to the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, however, the United States stressed its support for the treaty rather than efforts to secure Senate advice and consent to ratification. In a report to the conference, the United States noted its financial support for the CTBTO PrepCom and stated, "The United States fully supports the activities of the CTBT Preparatory Commission as it makes the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty." At the conference, Secretary of State John Kerry said, "We have clearly demonstrated our commitment to abide by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." United Kingdom: The United Kingdom cannot test because it held its nuclear tests for several decades at the Nevada Test Site and does not have its own test site. Its last test was held in 1991. Britain and France became the first of the original five nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, depositing instruments of ratification with the United Nations on April 6, 1998. On February 14, 2002, and February 23, 2006, the United Kingdom conducted subcritical experiments jointly with the United States at the Nevada Test Site. The United Kingdom and France maintain their own separate stockpile stewardship programs to maintain existing warheads and, if necessary, develop new ones. For example, the U.K. Atomic Weapons Establishment uses two sites: Aldermaston, which conducts R&D and some manufacturing, and Burghfield, which conducts final assembly, maintenance, and decommissioning of warheads. The United Kingdom and France are also pooling stockpile stewardship resources. A declaration from the November 2010 U.K.-French summit announced the decision by the two states to collaborate in the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations, through unprecedented co-operation at a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of our nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety – this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the UK. Stockpile stewardship supports the stockpile, but at issue for the United Kingdom is what weapons it will have in the future, and even whether it will have a nuclear force. The U.K. nuclear force consists of Trident II (D-5) missiles aboard four ballistic missile submarines. With the submarines approaching the end of their service lives, at issue is whether to replace them with something other than ballistic missile submarines (e.g., bombers, land-based missiles, or missiles on attack submarines), and if ballistic missile submarines are chosen, whether to build four or fewer. Scotland held a referendum on September 18, 2014, on whether to become an independent country, and chose to remain part of the United Kingdom. Prior to the vote, there was considerable concern over what would become of the U.K. nuclear deterrent if Scotland were to become independent, as all U.K. ballistic missile submarines are based at Faslane, Scotland. In October 2012, Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), said, "The SNP Government will be bringing forward a white paper on independence which proposes a written constitution for an independent Scotland, and that constitution will have to be ratified by the Scottish Parliament elected in 2016. The SNP position on this is that the constitution should include an explicit ban on nuclear weapons being based on Scottish territory." If Scotland had decided to become independent and to ban nuclear weapons in its territory, it is unclear what steps Britain would have taken regarding its missile submarine force. Indeed, according to one report of October 2012, "The UK defence secretary [Philip Hammond] said he was making no contingency plans for moving Trident out of Scotland in the event of its people voting yes to independence." Another view put forward in August 2014 was that the Trident base could be relocated to a site within England. However, Scotland's vote to remain part of the United Kingdom has rendered these concerns moot. France: On June 13, 1995, President Jacques Chirac announced that France would conduct eight nuclear tests at its test site at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, finishing by the end of May 1996. The armed services had reportedly wanted the tests to check existing warheads, validate a new warhead, and develop a computer system to simulate warheads to render further testing unneeded. Many nations criticized the decision. On August 10, 1995, France indicated it would halt all nuclear tests once the test series was finished and favored a CTBT that would ban "any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion." France conducted six tests from September 5, 1995, to January 27, 1996. On January 29, 1996, Chirac announced the end to French testing. On April 6, 1998, France and Britain deposited instruments of ratification of the CTBT with the United Nations. See the section on the United Kingdom, above, for information on a U.K.-French collaboration on stockpile stewardship. Russia: Several press reports between 1996 and 1999 claimed that Russia may have conducted low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site at Novaya Zemlya; other reports stated that U.S. reviews of the data determined that these events were earthquakes. Several reports between 1998 and 2000 stated that Russia had conducted "subcritical" nuclear experiments, discussed below, which the CTBT does not bar. The report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States presents arguments for and against the CTBT; one argument by opponents is, "Apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests." This charge was reiterated in a September 2011 article: "Russia apparently has continued to test nuclear weapons at very low yields, despite its commitment not to do so." Russia ratified the treaty on June 30, 2000. In September 2005, Russia reportedly stated that it intends to continue to observe the moratorium on testing until the CTBT enters into force as long as other nuclear powers do likewise, and expressed its hope that the nations that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force will do so as soon as possible. In November 2007, according to Itar-Tass, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "confirmed Russia's unchanging support for the treaty as one of the key elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an effective nuclear arms limitation tool." In September 2009, Dmitry Medvedev, president of the Russian Federation, said, "we need to encourage leading countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible in order to ensure its ultimate entry into force. That is very important." A Russian scholar at the Russian Academy of Sciences raised the prospect of the CTBT's collapse in an article of November 2010. Claiming that Britain and France have ratified the treaty but do