Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Aug. 15, 2016 |
| Report Number |
RS22644 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
R. Sam Garrett, Specialist in American National Government; L. Paige Whitaker, Legislative Attorney |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)), allows political party committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election candidates for federal office and specifies limits on such spending. These "coordinated party expenditures" are important not only because they provide financial support to campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns may explicitly discuss how the money is spent. Although they have long been the major source of direct party financial support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have recently been overshadowed by independent expenditures.
In a 1996 ruling, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Colorado I), the U.S. Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Federal campaign finance law defines an independent expenditure to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate or a political party. In a subsequent case, Colorado II, however, the Court ruled that a political party's coordinated expendituresâthat is, expenditures made in cooperation or consultation with a candidateâmay be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. According to the Court, in contrast to independent expenditures, coordinated party expenditures have no "significant functional difference" from direct party candidate contributions.
Despite limited legislative activity on the topic in recent Congresses, coordinated party expenditures remain a component of the debate over the strength of modern political parties. In the 113th Congress, bills primarily related to public financing of campaigns (H.R. 20, H.R. 268, H.R. 269, H.R. 270, and S. 2023) would also permit additional coordinated party expenditures. Revisiting coordinated party expenditure limits might also be relevant following an April 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Recent media reports have also suggested that language to alter coordinated party expenditure limits could be included in appropriations bills or other measures during the remainder of the 113th Congress or early in the 114th Congress.
Those who support existing limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the caps reduce potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that the limits are antiquated, particularly because political parties may make unlimited independent expenditures supporting their candidates. If the caps were lifted and fundraising patterns remained consistent with those discussed here, it appears that neither party would have a substantial resource advantage over the other. It is important to note, however, that individual circumstances would determine particular fundraising and spending decisions.
This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.
