Constitutional Limits to Agency Independence (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
June 1, 2016 |
| Report Number |
AGENCYIND |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Congressional authority to establish federal agencies with independence from political control is under scrutiny in a case
pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit). At issue in PHH Corp. v.
CFPB is whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) structure violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. The CFPB is headed by a single director who enjoys a certain amount of protection from removal
by the President, and the agency is funded outside of the annual appropriations process. As elaborated below, PHH
claims that the restrictions on the President’s power to remove the Director improperly encroach on the executive
power vested in the President under Article II of the Constitution, and that the combination of insulation from executive
control and independence from yearly congressional appropriations violates separation of powers by shielding the
agency from “democratic accountability.”
