LegiStorm

Summary:

The landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma's November 2015 parliamentary elections may prove to be a major step in the nation's potential transition to a more democratic government. Having won nearly 80% of the contested seats in the election, the NLD has a majority in both chambers of the Union Parliament, which gave it the ability to select the President-elect, as well as control of most of the nation's Regional and State Parliaments. Burma's 2008 constitution, however, grants the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, widespread powers in the governance of the nation, and nearly complete autonomy from civilian control. One quarter of the seats in each chamber of the Union Parliament are reserved for military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief, giving them the ability to block any constitutional amendments. Military officers constitute a majority of the National Defence and Security Council, an 11-member body with some oversight authority over the President. The constitution also grants the Tatmadaw "the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed services," and designates the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services as "the Supreme Commander' of all armed forces," which could have serious implications for efforts to end the nation's six-decade-long, low-grade civil war. For Congress and the Obama Administration, the election results and a transition period that will last several months raise a number of questions for U.S. policy toward Burma. To what extent does the election and formation of an NLD-led government constitute the partial achievement of the U.S. goal to see a civilian democratically elected government in Burma? Under what conditions and when should the Obama Administration and/or Congress consider relaxing or revoking existing restrictions on relations with Burma? Should the Obama Administration or Congress undertake any new programs or activities in Burma, and if so, at what stage in the transition process? Congress gave one indication of its answers to these questions in December 2015 when it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which continued some restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma, while requiring new forms of engagement. A new NLD-led government may not be fully in place before summer 2016. The new Union Parliament took office in early February, and on March 15 selected Htin Kyaw as the nation's next President. The President-elect is to be sworn into office on March 30, 2016, and will have to appoint new Ministers for his government, as well as Chief Ministers for the nation's 14 Regions and States. The NLD government will face great expectations from the Burmese people to address the country's more serious problems. These include a six-decade-long, low-grade civil war; serious ethnic and religious tensions (especially in Rakhine State); poor conditions for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons; and an inefficient and distorted economy. The new government faces the issue of cooperation with the Tatmadaw to address some of these problems; it is unclear if the Burmese military will be willing to cooperate. What measures the Obama Administration or Congress choose to take, if any, to alter current U.S. policy toward Burma will likely depend on several factors. The first factor is how the transition process proceeds and what the new NLD-led government looks like in terms of parliamentary and ministerial leadership. Another factor is timing; a clearer picture of Burma's political situation is likely to emerge just as the United States enters into the height of its election season.