Russia and U.S. Foreign Assistance: 1992-1996 (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
March 20, 1996 |
| Report Number |
96-261 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Curt Tarnoff, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
This report, written in 1996, provides historical background that may be useful to Congress as
it
considers funding levels, types of programs, and problems in implementation of U.S. assistance to
other countries.
As defined by Congress in the FREEDOM Support Act and the pronouncements of two
Administrations, among key objectives of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia are the promotion of
a democratic system and a free market economy. Foreign assistance has been a prominent tool of
that policy.
Many factors in the United States and Russia have affected the course of the U.S. program of
assistance to Russia. In the United States, there has been some expectation that the program would
succeed quickly. When that did not happen and Russian government behavior did not meet
expectations, some sought to cut the program. U.S. budget pressures also have affected the Russia
program. Although Russia has experienced much economic and political progress in a relatively
short time, this has been accompanied by an uncertain political situation exacerbated by growing
economic inequality. Nevertheless, supporters of reform are reportedly emerging in all corners of
Russia and these appear very pro-United States.
Criticisms raised regarding the assistance program during its first years are being addressed by
the Administration. Interagency coordination has improved, problem programs cut or eliminated,
reformers targeted, and assistance funds leveraged to bring in other donors. Large contractors and
grantees have improved their operations, but some observers still feel that while small U.S.
organizations can best implement the program, they are the most threatened by cuts.
The assistance program is seeking to engage all levels of private sector and democratic system
development -- at the top to promote policy reform, at the institutional level helping to strengthen
government and private sector organizations, and at the grassroots to help individual businesses and
NGOs (non-governmental organizations). In order to expedite the reform process and help them
avoid mistakes, a major focus of assistance activity is the transfer of information to reformist
Russians who want to know how things are done elsewhere.
The budget for Russia has gone from $1.3 billion in FY1994 to $341 million in FY1995 and
an estimated $168 million in FY1996. Many programs are ending earlier than originally anticipated
and new ones not starting up. The consequences of such an abrupt decrease in funding are not clear
with regard to Russian development in general but some fear that U.S. objectives in the country will
be retarded.
In 1994, the Administration informed Congress that technical assistance requests would largely
end after the FY1998 appropriation. Realizing that U.S. interests regarding Russia would also not
end at that point, individuals in the State Department have begun to ponder the shape of
U.S.-Russian relations in the future and a "baseline" program of assistance that might be considered
in the long term.
