Israeli-Turkish Relations (CRS Report for Congress)
Premium Purchase PDF for $24.95 (18 pages)
add to cart or
subscribe for unlimited access
Pro Premium subscribers have free access to our full library of CRS reports.
Subscribe today, or
request a demo to learn more.
| Release Date |
July 17, 1998 |
| Report Number |
98-633 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Carol Migdalovitz, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Agreements reached in the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1993 until 1995 made relations
between
Israel and its Arab and Muslim neighbors more acceptable in the latter circles. Israeli-Turkish ties
are the most portentous development in this area, and they have not been impeded by subsequent
difficulties in the peace process.
The main dimension of Turkish-Israeli relations is military. Landmark agreements on military
cooperation in February 1996 and on military industrial cooperation in April 1996 have produced
unprecedented military exercises and training, arms sales, and strategic talks. The civilian dimension
of the new partnership is expanding rapidly, spurred by a 1996 Free Trade Agreement and resulting
increases in non-military trade.
Israeli-Turkish relations are founded on historical cordiality between Turks and Jews, and are
motivated by the self-interest of each side. Turkey had been concerned about what it viewed as
detrimental repercussions from a possible Israeli-Syrian peace agreement and wanted to be
consulted. It also sought to send a cautionary message to Damascus about its aid to the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK),which has been waging a guerrilla war in southeast Turkey since 1984, and
about unresolved disputes over water and territory. Moreover, Turkey needed a response to
Greece's policy of encircling it with military agreements, including an unsubstantiated arrangement
with Syria. Finally, the Israeli connection enables Turkey to circumvent U.S. and European arms
embargos and what it believes to be the influence of anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies in Congress.
Purchase of Israeli arms allows Turkey to avoid the strictures of politically conditioned European
and U.S. sales, and possibly to mitigate the anti-Turkish policies of governments competing with
Israel to sell arms to Turkey. For its part, Israel initially perceived Turkey as a bridge to the Arab
and Muslim worlds, but also may have wanted to vent its frustrations over what it views as Syria's
intransigence in peace talks. Israel has found a more lasting commonality with Turkey on anti-
terrorism and in military and civilian trade.
There is only mild domestic dissent in Turkey and Israel over enhanced relations. Some
governments in the region have reacted more forcefully. Syria, viewing itself as the unstated target
of the new allies, has mobilized Arab and Islamic condemnation, reached out to Baghdad to indicate
possibilities of a counter-bloc, but eventually opened a dialogue with Turkey. Egypt's reaction has
been moderate in bilateral talks with Ankara, but negative in multilateral Arab and Muslim forums.
Jordan has attended some Turkish-Israeli events, but has pointedly noted that its actions were in
response to invitations from Ankara, not Israel, while the peace talks are stalled. Greek officials and
some in Cyprus are concerned that Israeli military and intelligence assistance to Turkey might
eventually be used against them, and direct their criticism to Jerusalem.
The U.S. government views Israeli-Turkish relations positively, as contributing to regional
peace and stability. Possible effects on other U.S. policy priorities in the region are not yet clear.
The U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement and the Arms Export Control Act may be implicated in
individual Israeli-Turkish deals.
