NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
Revised Dec. 3, 2009 |
Report Number |
RL33627 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Vincent Morelli, Section Research Manager; Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan is seen by many as a test of the alliance's political will and military capabilities. Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the allies have sought to create a "new" NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Afghanistan is NATO's first "out-of-area" mission beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission has proven difficult, an "industrial-strength" insurgency according to General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban insurgents continue. The situation in Afghanistan has seen a rise in the overall level of violence due to increased Taliban military operations, an increase in terrorist-related activities, and recent major offensive operations conducted by the allies.
U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO's responsibilities in Afghanistan. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles: shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO's mission statement lays out the essential elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army, police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban.
Between 2001 and 2006, ISAF proceeded in four stages to extend its area of responsibility over the whole of Afghanistan. Although the allies agree on ISAF's mission, they have differed on how to accomplish it. Some allies continue to restrict their forces from engaging in counter-insurgency operations and have placed operational restrictions on their troops. The principal mechanism to rebuild Afghanistan are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) composed of military and civilian officials and charged with extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and rebuilding the economy. The counter-narcotics efforts involving the destruction of poppy fields and drug facilities seems to be making some head way although drugs are still a major source of funds for the insurgents. Finally, continued turmoil in parts of Pakistan has complicated the effort to prevent the Taliban from infiltrating Afghanistan.
Most observers suggest that ISAF's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require a long-term commitment from the allies. The Obama Administration has made the conflict a policy priority. On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan including the decision to commit an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces to address the conflict. The plan also considers the idea of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beginning in 2011 if conditions on the ground warrant. The 111th Congress continues to support the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan despite some rising opposition influenced in part by a growing negative public opinion in the United States towards the war and the added cost of the expanded war. The Congress has also demanded more integration and cooperation among all parties involved in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale.