LegiStorm

Summary:

In early and mid-2009, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) embarked on a course that included a series of extremely provocative military actions, a shift in power toward the military, emphasis on ideological purity, rising criticism of the United States, and going forward with its nuclear and missile program in spite of sanctions and objections from much of the rest of the world. As 2009 ended, the DPRK was in the midst of a "charm offensive" in which it took specific actions to ease tensions with the United States and South Korea and appears to have reinvigorated its relationship with China. Two factors seem to have operated to compel the more "aggressive" behavior by Pyongyang. The first is the apparent stroke by North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008. The country appeared to be preparing for succession, and in jockeying for position, the military seemed to have gained power. Kim Jong-il now seems to have recovered his health. The second has been preparations for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the founder of the DPRK, in 2012. By then the country wants to join the club of nuclear and space powers and to be an Asian tiger economy. The "charm offensive" seems to be aimed at restoring inflows of economic assistance and trade flows. North Korea's economic straits provide one of the few levers to move the country to cooperate in attempts by the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia to halt and dismantle its nuclear program. These five countries plus North Korea comprise the "six parties" who are engaged in talks to resolve issues raised by the DPRK's development of a nuclear weapon. The Six-Party Talks are now stalled. Western leverage over the DPRK remains limited, but China, and to some extent Russia, are in a position to exert pressure on Pyongyang. The economy of North Korea is of interest to Congress because it provides the financial and industrial resources for the Kim Jong-il regime to develop its military and to remain in power, constitutes an important "push factor" for potential refugees seeking to flee the country, creates pressures for the country to trade in arms or engage in illicit economic activity, is a rationale for humanitarian assistance, and creates instability that affects South Korea and China in particular. The dismal economic conditions also foster forces of discontent that potentially could turn against the Kim regime—especially if knowledge of the luxurious lifestyle of communist party leaders becomes better known or as poor economic performance hurts even the elite. North Korea has extensive trading relationships with China and Russia and, until recently, with South Korea. U.S. and Japanese trade with North Korea since 2006 has been virtually nil except for U.S. aid deliveries. The DPRK has been running an estimated $1 billion deficit per year in its international trade accounts, which it funds primarily through receipts of foreign assistance and foreign investment as well as through exports of arms and various questionable activities. Following the DPRK's second nuclear test and subsequent actions, the focus in 2009 has been on negative incentives and increasing sanctions. The larger question, however, is how to move beyond tit-for-tat actions to a three-fold transformation of the DPRK: a transformation in its international relations, in the Stalinist methods by which the Communist regime maintains its support, and in a moribund economy that cannot feed its own population. This report will be updated as conditions warrant.