Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Sept. 4, 1998 |
| Report Number |
98-129 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Bowman, Steve |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Since 1991, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has destroyedover 38,000 filled and unfilled chemical weapons (CW) munitions, 690 metric tons ofCW agents, 3,000 metric tons of CW precursor chemicals, and over 400 pieces of CWproduction equipment. The Iraqi government maintains that all its chemical andbiological weapons (CBW) arsenal and production capability has been destroyed eitherby UNSCOM or in 1991 by the Iraqis themselves in unauthorized activities whichviolated U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. UNSCOM maintains that Iraq has notprovided verification of this destruction, and has a substantial record of deception andomission in its CBW declarations to the United Nations. British and U.S. intelligencereports in February 1998 and the UNSCOM report to the Security Council in April 1998assert that Iraq has not accounted for and may still possess a significant CBW capability,including: 500-700 mustard agent artillery shells, over 150 bombs filled with BWagents, and 45 CBW missile warheads. In addition, UNSCOM believes that Iraqmanufactured over 200 metric tons of the persistent nerve agent VX, but has accountedfor only 3.9 tons. Growth medium sufficient to produce 16,000 liters of anthrax has alsonot been accounted for. These reports are based on defector debriefings, records ofpurchases, and Iraqi documents. U.N., British, and U.S. officials believe that withoutcontinuous U.N. monitoring, Iraq would be capable of restoring its CBW productionwithin months. Owing to obstruction of UNSCOM inspections, the question ofairstrikes against suspected CBW sites has arisen, but lack of certainty about targets andconcerns about collateral casualties have inhibited action. Potential casualties from thepurposeful of use of CBW were estimated by the Office of Technology Assessment,using a Washington DC scenario, to range from several hundred to several million,depending on the agent used and weather. A glossary of CBW terms is appended to thisreport. This report will be updated only to reflect substantial new information. Foradditional information, see CRS Issue Brief 92117 Iraqi Compliance with Cease-fireAgreements, by Kenneth Katzman.
