Iran: U.S. Policy and Options (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Jan. 14, 2000 |
| Report Number |
97-231 |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Iran and the United States have been adversaries, and have sometimes engaged in low-level
military
hostilities, since Iran's Islamic revolution on February 11, 1979. During its first term, the Clinton
Administration sought to build on earlier policies designed to contain Iran and moderate its behavior.
The Clinton Administration initially placed its policy of containing Iran within a broader framework
for keeping both Iran and Iraq weak, terming the policy "dual containment." The Administration
maintained that dual containment was a necessary departure from past Persian Gulf policies in which
the United States has alternately tilted toward either Iran or Iraq to maintain stability in the Persian
Gulf.
In the absence of U.N. sanctions on Iran, as exist on Iraq, in 1995 and 1996, the Clinton
Administration and Congress undertook a number of new measures to contain Iran. Foremost
among these steps were expanded U.S. economic sanctions, including a ban on U.S. trade and
investment in Iran and sanctions on foreign firms that make substantial investments in Iran's energy
sector. U.S. military assets, in addition to those needed to deter Iraq, were sent to the Gulf to
monitor Iran's growing naval capabilities and to help deter Iranian consideration of coercive
maritime adventures. Similarly, U.S. arms sales and advice to the Persian Gulf states were designed
to help the Gulf states defend themselves against potential attacks by Iran as well as by Iraq.
In late 1996, a debate began to develop over Clinton Administration policy toward Iran.
Several
prominent foreign policy experts maintained that the United States and Iran have some interests in
common, such as containing Iraq and ending the continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Others noted
that differences over how to deal with Iran had become a serious irritant in U.S.-European relations.
This debate accelerated following the upset victory by a relative moderate in Iran's May 23, 1997
presidential election. By early 1998, following the unexpected election of a relative moderate as
Iran's president, a consensus emerged within the Administration to try to engage Iran in a political
dialogue or in mutual confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to normal relations.
Administration officials maintain that discussions with Iran could yield progress in key areas of U.S.
concern, which include: Iran's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, its support for
international terrorism, and its backing for groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
The Administration's apparent policy shift has created concern among some groups and
Members of Congress that the Administration will make substantive concessions to Iran in advance
of clear changes in Iran's international behavior. Although some Members now appear to accept the
concept of U.S. dialogue with Iran, some Members are concerned that Iran would try to take
advantage of any easing of U.S. containment policy to accelerate a strategic buildup and fund Middle
Eastern terrorist groups.
