BB&T and SunTrust: Merger Approval Process and Trends (CRS Report for Congress)
Release Date |
July 19, 2019 |
Report Number |
IN11146 |
Report Type |
Insight |
Authors |
Marc Labonte; David W. Perkins |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
BB&T and SunTrust have proposed a merger that could form the eighth-largest bank holding company (BHC) by assets in the United States (see CRS Insight IN11062, BB&T and SunTrust: The Latest Proposed Merger in a Long-Term Trend of Banking Industry Consolidation). This has focused congressional attention on bank mergers. This Insight examines the bank merger regulatory approval process.
Merger Approval Process
BB&T and Suntrust are both BHCs with state-chartered subsidiary banks. The Suntrust bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System. As such, the merger must be approved by the Federal Reserve (the Fed; primary federal regulator of BHCs and state member banks) under the Bank Holding Company Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC; primary regulator of state nonmember banks) under the Bank Merger Act.
Pursuant to these acts, mergers must meet several statutory conditions to be approved. The agencies' mandates are similar in some ways (e.g., both consider financial and managerial resources and anti-money laundering compliance) and differ in others (e.g., the Fed must consider financial stability implications). Particularly pertinent in large bank mergers, both must consider competitive factors (i.e., the potential for monopoly power or anticompetitive effects) and the community's needs and convenience. For example, the merged entity may not initially hold more than 10% of total deposits nationally, 10% of all financial company liabilities nationally, or 30% of deposits in any state (certain states may have additional limits). The Department of Justice reviews mergers for compliance with federal antitrust laws. Furthermore, merging entities must have a good record of consumer protection compliance and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; 12 U.S.C. §§2901-2908) performance.
The process includes opportunities for public input. Applicants generally must publish notice of their merger proposals, typically in newspapers, informing the public of the opportunity to submit written comments. In addition, the agencies may hold hearings on proposals, allowing interested parties to testify.
BB&T and SunTrust Considerations
Large bank mergers have been infrequent in the current economic expansion. A CRS analysis of S&P Global Intelligence data indicates that since 2010, in 88% of bank acquisitions, the acquired bank had assets of less than $1 billion, whereas 1% of acquisitions were for banks with greater than $10 billion in assets. The BB&T-SunTrust proposal is an outlier in comparison. Suntrust has $215.5 billion of assets, making it over twice as large as the next biggest post-crisis acquisition (see Table 1.)
Table 1. Largest Postcrisis Mergers, by Acquired Bank Assets
($ in billions)
Announced date
Buyer
Acquired
Acquired Assets
2/7/2019
BB&T Corporation
SunTrust Banks, Inc.
$215.5
6/16/2011
Capital One Financial Corporation
ING Bank, FSB
$92.2
12/17/2010
Bank of Montreal
Marshall & Ilsley Corporation
$51.9
8/27/2012
M&T Bank Corporation
Hudson City Bancorp, Inc.
$43.6
10/30/2015
KeyCorp
First Niagara Financial Group, Inc.
$39.4
1/22/2015
Royal Bank of Canada
City National Corporation
$32.6
6/20/2011
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
RBC Bank (USA)
$27.4
8/8/2016
TIAA Board of Overseers
EverBank Financial Corp
$27.4
1/26/2016
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated
FirstMerit Corporation
$25.5
7/22/2014
CIT Group Inc.
IMB HoldCo LLC
$22.6
Source: S&P Global Intelligence, Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis.
Absent divestitures, the merged entity would currently have $441.2 billion in assets, well above the $250 billion threshold that automatically subjects it to enhanced prudential regulation (EPR) mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. However, a bank of this size does not necessarily pose national anticompetitive or financial-stability issues. BB&T and SunTrust have already complied individually with most EPR requirements that would apply to the merged entity, because the threshold has only recently been increased from $50 billion. The merger application notes that the merged bank would remain significantly smaller than the very largest BHCs and hold 2.5% of U.S. banking assets and 2.7% of deposits. However, competitive effects are also considered at the state and local level. Because both banks are concentrated in the Southeast, they are proposing to divest branches in markets where their market share would be too great (the specific branches proposed are confidential).
Merger approvals are one of the main CRA enforcement mechanisms. The merger application reports a current CRA rating of "outstanding" for BB&T and "satisfactory" for SunTrust.
In regard to anti-money laundering compliance, a consent order was issued in 2017 requiring BB&T to correct deficiencies in its compliance risk management program. The merger application details the steps BB&T has taken since, and in April the consent order was terminated.
Merger Approval Trends
How frequently are merger applications approved? Data are available from the Fed covering 2006 to 2017 and from the FDIC covering 2013 to 2017. (As noted above, most of these mergers involved small banks.) In practice, no application was formally rejected over these periods. Instead, applicants withdrew them before rejection, and the FDIC may also return applications. Alternately, banks might not file an application if preliminary discussions with the agencies raise concerns.
At the Fed, the approval rate has increased since the crisis, as shown in the ratio of approved to withdrawn applications in Table 2. After reaching a postcrisis low of 2.8 in 2010, the ratio rose in most years. In 2017 and 2018, it surpassed precrisis levels, reaching 19.0 in 2018. For the FDIC, the data show no clear trend, although 2018 does have the highest ratio of the years available.
Table 2. Federal Reserve Merger Application Statistics
Year
Approved
Withdrawn
Ratio
Average Days
2006
463
44
10.5
n/a
2007
466
36
12.9
n/a
2008
320
62
5.2
n/a
2009
222
66
3.4
n/a
2010
223
80
2.8
n/a
2011
194
43
4.5
71
2012
226
43
5.3
66
2013
190
40
4.8
56
2014
248
25
9.9
60
2015
279
21
13.3
71
2016
245
28
8.8
59
2017
240
15
16.0
65
2018
190
10
19.0
57
Source: Letter from Jerome H. Powell, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to the Honorable Elizabeth Warren, May 10, 2018; The Federal Reserve, Semiannual Report on Banking Applications Activity, vol. 6, no. 1, March 2019; CRS calculations.
Table 3. FDIC Regular Merger Application Statistics
Year
Approved
Withdrawn/
Returned
Ratio
Average Days
2013
143
17
8.4
65
2014
136
12
11.3
66
2015
149
7
21.3
64
2016
119
9
13.2
69
2017
118
8
14.8
62
2018
140
6
23.3
68
Source: FDIC Bank Application Action database, at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/actions.html.
No clear trend is present in the average number of days for merger approval. Recently, approvals in cases that elicit adverse public comments have occurred more quickly, however. Although these proposals still take longer to approve than others, as shown in Table 4, the time has shortened in recent years, reaching 113 days in 2018.
Table 4. Approvals by Comment Type
Federal Reserve Applications
No Adverse Public Comments
Adverse Public Comments
Year
Number
Average days
Number
Average days
2011
182
62
12
212
2012
219
60
7
283
2013
184
52
6
203
2014
237
53
11
209
2015
262
56
17
297
2016
233
53
12
159
2017
219
56
19
173
2018
178
50
12
113
Source: The Federal Reserve, Semiannual Report on Banking Applications Activity, vol. 6, no. 1, March 2019.
Some critics believe that the banking regulators are too deferential to banks in their interpretation of the statutory considerations when approving mergers. Other critics believe the process allows outside actors to use adverse public comments to extract inappropriate concessions from the merging banks.
These trends might shed some light on whether merger approval standards have changed, although conclusions would be limited by the small number of withdrawn/returned applications and the lack of formal rejections and data on inquiries that did not result in applications. The increasing approved-to-withdrawn ratio at the Fed could be evidence that standards have become more permissive. (FDIC data are not available over the same period.) Similarly, the average days to approval has fallen significantly in cases where there were adverse public comments, although the overall days to approval shows no trend.
However, other possible explanations exists for such trends. For example, the quality of applications could have improved, because of improving economic conditions or if merger requirements in the postcrisis regulatory environment became clearer.