Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
Revised Aug. 9, 2018 |
Report Number |
RL34327 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Mary Beth Nikitin |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was formed to increase international cooperation in
interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and
related materials. The Initiative was announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003. PSI does not
create a new legal framework but aims to use existing national authorities and international law to
achieve its goals. Initially, 11 nations signed on to the “Statement of Interdiction Principles” that
guides PSI cooperation. As of June 2018, 105 countries (plus the Holy See) have committed
formally to the PSI principles, although the extent of participation may vary by country. PSI has
no secretariat, but an Operational Experts Group (OEG), made up of 21 PSI participants,
coordinates activities.
Although WMD interdiction efforts took place with international cooperation before PSI was
formed, supporters argue that PSI training exercises and boarding agreements give a structure and
expectation of cooperation that has improved interdiction efforts. Many observers believe that
PSI’s “strengthened political commitment of like-minded states” to cooperate on interdiction is a
successful approach to counter-proliferation policy. The effort faced early criticism that said it
would be difficult to measure the initiative’s effectiveness, guarantee even participation, or
sustain the effort over time in the absence of a formal multilateral framework. However,
successive Administrations have supported the PSI and worked to expand membership. Its goals
have been a part of U.S. national security strategy. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review says, “The
United States will continue to work with allies and partners to disrupt proliferation networks and
interdict transfers of nuclear materials and related technology.”
This report will be updated as events warrant.