A Peace Treaty with North Korea? (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
Revised April 19, 2018 |
Report Number |
R45169 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Emma Chanlett-Avery; Susan V. Lawrence; Mark E. Manyin; Mary Beth D. Nikitin |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Older Revisions |
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Summary:
After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington, in March
2018 President Donald J. Trump agreed to attend a summit in spring 2018 with North Korean
leader Kim Jong-un. South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) issued the invitation
and said that North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) was
ready to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons and missile programs. The meeting, which is to
follow a scheduled April 27, 2018, summit between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jaein,
would be the first ever between leaders of the two countries.
If the U.S.-DPRK opening leads to further talks, the agenda might include negotiating a
permanent peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula, reportedly a top priority for South Korea.
1
The 1950-1953 Korean War ended in a truce, with the U.S.-led United Nations Command, North
Korea, and China signing an armistice that was intended to be temporary.2 Over the course of past
negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program, many parties have proposed that the major
participants in the Korean War conclude a permanent peace treaty, which would likely require
Senate ratification. As described below, during the 1990s and early 2000s, North Korea agreed on
several occasions to enter into discussions over a permanent peace settlement as part of accords
over the DPRK’s nuclear program, but such discussions over a peace settlement did not bear fruit.
North Korea, South Korea, China, and Russia all have suggested linking a peace treaty, also
referred to as a “peace regime” or “peace mechanism,” to North Korea abandoning its nuclear
weapons program. Through South Korean and Chinese intermediaries, Kim Jong-un has
reportedly expressed his desire to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with President
Trump and linked this to the dissolution of threats against North Korea and a guarantee of the
DPRK regime's security.3
In the past, North Korea has included the negotiation of a peace treaty
as part of its demand for security. South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who took office in May
2017, has said a peace treaty is a key part of his approach to North Korea. In 2016, China
proposed pursuing parallel negotiations toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty.4
In March 2017, China proposed, and
Russia subsequently endorsed, the idea of North Korea suspending its nuclear and missile
activities in exchange for the United States and South Korea suspending their large-scale joint
military exercises. This, they argued, could create conditions for the dual track negotiations aimed
at denuclearization of the peninsula and establishment of a “peace and security mechanism.”
Concluding a peace treaty presents many challenges. First, although the other major players
propose linking a peace settlement to denuclearization, North Korea’s longstanding policy has
been that it will not agree to give up its nuclear weapons until the United States drops what
Pyongyang calls its “hostile policy.” In theory, this could be addressed through negotiating a
peace treaty. North Korea, however, may demand other concessions from the United States, such
as a reduction or wholesale withdrawal of the U.S. military presence on the Peninsula, and
removal of its designation as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. Most U.S. officials
are unwilling to consider any pledge to reduce the U.S. military presence, particularly given
North Korea’s history of threats and provocations. Congress might also object to a terrorism
delisting.
Second, for decades, North Korea has signaled a preference for bilateral negotiations, likely
seeing direct talks as conferring more prestige on the regime, lessening their economic
dependence on China, and marginalizing South Korea. The United States has traditionally
insisted that South Korea and China also participate. It is not clear whether the Trump
Administration will continue this policy if U.S.-DPRK discussions advance. The issue may be
rendered moot if the two Koreas agree that a peace settlement is part of the agenda of the April 27
Moon-Kim summit and any inter-Korean diplomacy that ensues.
Third, on the occasions when Pyongyang has agreed to enter into discussions over peace treaty
negotiations that involve China and South Korea, those talks have been unsuccessful in
convincing North Korea to rein in its nuclear and missile programs. Fourth, many experts believe
that the Kim Jong-un regime is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons program regardless of the
inducements offered.6
Finally, many observers are skeptical that North Korea would abide by any
agreement.